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Abstract
Can international institutions work independently from the great powers in terms
of autonomy and independence? To answer the question, this thesis analyzes 197
concluded arbitration cases and the Convention of the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID). But why the ICSID?
Trade liberalization has long been sought by almost all the countries under
multilateralism represented by the GATT and its successor, the WTO. However, due
mainly to slow and laborious decision making, proceedings for dispute settlement and
acquiring mandatory consent from all the member countries under the WTO, states especially great economic powers - began to turn to Free Trade Agreements(FTAs) to
avoid such problems. Most of the FTAs include Bilateral Investment Treaties and
investment dispute settlement provisions.
When investment disputes arise, the parties can resolve them bilaterally or they
may bring their cases to an international dispute settlement institution. The ICSID is one
of leading dispute settlement institutions in the field of international investments. Since
the late 1990s, the cases argued at and the references to the ICSID began to increase
sharply indicating that states have begun to perceive the ICSID as more important. So I
analyzed the ICSID in terms of its autonomy and independence. The findings are as
follows.
Throughout the Articles of the ICSID Convention, the ICSID endeavors to keep
its autonomy and independence. Although there are more arbitrators from developing
countries than developed countries in the arbitration panel, developed country arbitrators
have been selected more frequently as members of arbitration Tribunals of the ICSID.
But the compositions of the Tribunals do not affect the winning rate especially for
developed country in the arbitrations. Although the durations of the arbitration
proceedings vary in each party category, developing countries tend to show their lack of
legal capacities and monetary shortage, especially needed for the due process procedures
in arbitrations. As for compliance to ICSID awards, almost all the Contracting States
followed the awards except for some cases, especially Argentine ones.
In general, the ICSID has maintained its autonomy and independence though
there also is some evidence and some cases where this argument is not supported. As
more pending cases turn to concluded ones, there will be more cases available for further
research on the ICSID.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Can international institutions work independently from sovereign states in
particular from those states which are great powers? Can they promote cooperation
among nation states? Considerable scholarly efforts to find answers to these questions
have been made in the area of international organizations and law. Generally speaking,
from the perspective of realism, international institutions are still the tools by which
nations wield their power for their national interests. However, from the perspective of
institutional liberalism, it is argued that international institutions can work for
international cooperation by implementing rules and developing norms in the world.
Efforts to resolve these theoretical issues have been often hampered by cross-institutional
and temporal variations that limit how widely generalizations can be drawn. In this regard,
this thesis intends to contribute to the literature of this area by examining dispute
settlement institutions of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Specifically, the autonomy and
independence of international institutions are examined by studying the concluded cases
of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). When disputes
arise among member states in FTAs, they may, through the relevant provisions of such
agreements, bring their cases to a third party and the ICSID is one of them.
Why is it important to study the ICSID when there are many other international
arbitration institutions? The ICSID is an international arbitration institution focused on
investor-state dispute settlement. Its main role is to make a settlement between
Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States under the ICSID Convention.
1

The World Bank and other UN agencies work to make a favorable investment
environment in the world. For example, the World Bank publishes an annual Doing
Business Report for more favorable business climates; the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA) insures investment risks. United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is also in charge of some important tasks; 1)
monitoring foreign direct investment flows, 2) publishing bilateral investment treaties,
and 3) promoting more predictable investment environments. In spite of all these efforts
for more favorable investment environments, unfavorable situations still exist in the
international investment environment such as expropriation of the investor‟s property
without adequate compensation, governmental interference short of expropriation, a
government‟s non-observance of contractual obligations, discrimination, and unfair
treatment. Therefore there became a growing need for an impartial dispute resolution
institution such as the ICSID (Kryvoi, 2010). In a number of Bilateral Investment
Agreements and Free Trade Agreements, dispute settlement provisions like the ICSID
Convention are specified.
Many countries are joining Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) at a fast rate while
they are still pursuing liberalizing markets under World Trade Organization (WTO).
There are many reasons. Because of the laborious and slow proceedings through WTO,
great economic powers such as the US, Japan, and EU have begun to put more weight on
FTAs in order to liberalize markets. As participation in the WTO increases, proceeding in
a timely manner becomes more difficult. The WTO represents multilateral trade
agreements whereas FTAs feature bilateral trade agreements. Although there is dispute
2

settlement body in WTO, it takes a long time for the rulings to enter into effect.
Compared with the time period of processing in the WTO, the ruling processing in FTAs
usually takes less time. In addition, according to the Most Favored Nation status, member
states in the WTO should be treated equally when another agreement is made in general.
This situation is not so good for those countries which want to obtain exclusive benefits
from their partner countries. However, a country searching for a partner country in FTAs
needs only to satisfy its partner country‟s requirements. However, reaching an agreement
in the WTO usually requires meeting a variety of needs from member states in WTO.
With these reasons above, the number of FTAs is increasing.
However, as the number of FTAs has increased, so has the number of disputes
among member states. Nevertheless, little scholarly attention has been paid to the issue of
dispute settlement in FTAs and the role of dispute settlement institutions. From policy
perspective, it is important to study how disputes in FTAs are handled focusing on which
dispute settlement mechanisms works, how member states in FTAs deal with disputes,
and what kinds of solutions are preferred among the countries joining FTAs. From a
theoretical perspective, it is important to examine whether arbitration institutions work
independently from power politics, and if so, to what extent. This thesis explores these
research questions in detail.

I. Why FTAs? Trade Liberalization and Its Limit
After World War II ended, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
took the main role of liberalizing international trade throughout the world. Eight rounds
3

of multilateral agreements under GATT have been concluded since its establishment in
1947. In the eighth round, the so called Uruguay Round which was adopted after 12 years
of negotiations, the plan to establish the World Trade Organization (WTO) was suggested.
Finally WTO was established and became effective in January 1, 1995. In addition to
tariffs which have been the principal concern in the trade regime, agriculture, services,
capital, intellectual property, and textiles were included within this multilateral trade
regime. Both GATT and WTO were established based on the same purpose; to function
as the preferred forum for liberalizing international trade. The working mechanism of
both GATT and WTO has been based on multilateral agreements. Through Multilateral
agreements, GATT and WTO have tried to reduce trade distortions, maximize global
efficiency, and ensure non-discrimination with potential benefits for all parties. They
have made great contributions to worldwide economic growth and living standards. So
far WTO has provided a variety of benefits to facilitate trade among the nations.
Table 1 shows when the eight rounds have been held and what has been discussed
under GATT since 1947 and the first round since the establishment of WTO. So far there
have been nine rounds in total under GATT and WTO since 1947. And the most recent
round, the so called „Doha Development Agenda (DDA),‟ has not been concluded yet. As
seen in table 1, there is a tendency in general that the more participants join the rounds,
the longer the period for the rounds to be concluded.

4

Table 1. Trade Rounds under GATT and WTO

Round

Start

Duration

Principal Concern

# part.

Geneva

April 1947

7 months

Tariffs

23

Annecy

April 1949

5 months

Tariffs

13

Torquay

September 1950

8 months

Tariffs

38

Geneva II

January 1956

5 months

Tariffs, admission Japan

26

Dillon

September 1960

11 months

Tariffs

26

Kennedy

May 1964

37 months

Tariffs, anti-dumping

62

Tokyo

September 1973

74 months

Tariffs, NTBs, framework

102

Uruguay

September 1986

87 months

Tariffs, NTBs, services,
dispute settlement, textiles,
agriculture, WTO

123

?

Tariffs, NTBs, labor
standards, environment,
competition, investment,
transparency, patents

141

Doha

November 2001

Source: Neary (2003); NTBs = non-tariff barriers; # part. = number of participants

Figure 1 shows the duration of GATT and WTO rounds.
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Figure 1. Duration of GATT and WTO Rounds

Source: Neary (2003)

From the facts above, it is expected that the further rounds to come would take
more time to be concluded in comparison with the previous rounds. Consequently as the
time spent for rounds to be concluded takes longer, the agility and quick response of the
WTO to issues will also go down. The situation is not what the most nations joining in
the WTO would expect from it. Especially the industrialized countries like the United
States, European Union (EU), or Japan, are becoming less interested in increasing
international trade being just dependent on the WTO when considering their increasing
trade volumes through FTAs. And it seems this trend is spreading into other member
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states in the WTO as well. In fact, the number of regional and bilateral agreements is
increasing among the member states in the WTO in an attempt to expand their markets.
As stated above, due to the slow and laborious nature of multilateral trade
negotiations, many nations are now moving to supplement these multilateral mechanisms
with regional and bilateral agreements. Regional and bilateral agreements have been
regarded as divisive by many nations believing that they can cause trade diversion and
distortions and even undermine the multilateral system through the preferential treatment
given to the nations joining such agreements.
However, since 1994 when the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
was passed, many nations have showed their interest in joining regional trade agreements.
Table 2 shows all Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) in force, sorted by WTO Legal
Cover. Over 280 RTAs were in force as of 31 July in 2010. Of course there are some
reasons for the increasing number of RTAs among the nations in the WTO.
It is said that there are substantial advantages in concluding regional or bilateral
trade agreements. These agreements allow faster results in comparison with that of the
WTO. They enable trading partners to address specialized issues and to achieve
liberalization overcoming the obstacles existing within multilateral consensus. If they are
properly drafted and implemented, they can provide building blocks that can be
incorporated within the multilateral trade agenda as well. At a first glance, though it
seems the provisions of regional trade agreements are against the ones of the multilateral
trade regime, but the idea that these agreements make contributions to facilitate
international trade and to liberalize markets is now widely accepted.
7

Table 2. All RTAs in Force, sorted by WTO Legal Cover

Accessions

New RTAs

Grand Total

GATT Art. XXIV
(FTA)

2

156

158

GATT Art. XXIV (CU)

6

9

15

Enabling Clause

1

29

30

GATS Art. V

3

79

82

Grand Total

12

273

285

Source: http://www.wto.org

Largely speaking, many nations have expanded their markets through GATT and
the WTO liberalizing international trade. GATT and the WTO have provided, so far, a lot
of benefits for the nations to increase trade volume. However, due to some obstacles
found in the GATT and the WTO such as time-consuming and painstaking procedures of
multilateral trade negotiations, many nations have recently moved their focus onto
regional or bilateral agreements for the advantages which cannot be easily obtained
within multilateral trade regime. For example, faster results, an easier approach to deal
with special issues, better strategy for expanding markets, and so forth are benefits more
available under regional and bilateral agreement in comparison with the GATT and the
WTO. From these perspectives, many nations are shifting their focus on regional and
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bilateral agreements from multilateral trade regime. In fact many regional and bilateral
agreements are under negotiation and expected to be concluded in the foreseeable future.
However, it is also true that there have been lots of negative effects caused by
expanding international markets by making these agreements. Specific examples are
environmental concerns, increased unemployment, deprivation of human rights, lower
labor conditions, increased autonomy of transnational companies in other countries,
lower sovereignty of a nation, lower food sovereignty, growing inequality, patent
concerns, privatization in the fields of essential institutions for a nation‟s future such as
education, water supply, electricity, public service, national insurance policy, dispute
settlement among the nations in FTAs. And of course there many other concerns as well
when it comes to concluding FTAs.
Among many related issues, this thesis focuses on the dispute settlement
mechanism in FTAs.

II. Dispute Settlement in FTAs
How does the dispute settlement body function when disputes occur? As trade
disputes among member states in FTAs rapidly increase in the coming years, much more
attention should be given to this area. As I mentioned above, it is unavoidable for the
countries joining FTAs to face trade conflicts though the parties concerned try to do their
best in an attempt to decrease such conflicts during taking the steps toward satisfactory
agreements. In some cases, the parties concerned can approach problem issues and solve
them bilaterally. Or if it fails, then they could bring the cases to the third party such as an
9

arbitration institution for resolving trade conflicts. The importance of studying dispute
settlement mechanisms lies here.
International investment agreements (IIAs) at the bilateral, subregional, regional
and interregional levels will be further proliferated. There are over 2,400 bilateral
investment treaties (BITs), over 2,600 double taxation treaties (DTTs), numerous
preferential free trade and investment agreements (PTIAs), regional economic integration
agreements, and other multilateral agreements involving foreign investment in IIAs.
Specific procedures of settlement disputes are put in the agreements. When investor-state
disputes arise within IIAs, the parties are required to seek an amicable negotiated
settlement. If it fails to resolve a dispute, the next step is usually international arbitration.
Although there are dispute settlement provisions in such agreements, the use of the
provisions has been rare until recently. However, the number of cases has enormously
increased since the late 1990s (UNCTAD, 2005) As a consequence, the need to
understand dispute settlement mechanisms has increased as the number of disputes
between states has increased. Although studies on these institutions have been done
before, the area of inquiry still deserves attention so that parties involved in these disputes
may learn how to more effectively deal with one another and the international arbitrators
they deal with.

III. Plans for the Thesis
In order to answer the questions above, Chapter 2 reviews the two main
paradigms in international relations, especially in terms of viewing international
10

institutions in world politics. That is: Realism and Institutional Liberalism. I also review
pertinent literature in an attempt to see if international organizations are autonomous, and
therefore, if they can be impartial.
In Chapter 3, dispute settlement mechanisms are the main focus. When disputes
arise among member states in FTAs, how do the member states approach them? The
primary question is, „How is the dispute settlement mechanism in the WTO different
from the dispute settlement mechanisms in FTAs?‟ And I also ask some more questions
and answer them. How do they settle the disputes? In general, do they solve the disputes
bilaterally? or do they bring the cases to third party arbitration institutions. If so, what
makes the member states act differently? What kinds of dispute settlement institutions are
there when disputes arise? These questions are dealt with in this chapter.
As for Chapter 4, study of the dispute settlement issue is narrowed down by
focusing on the cases of ICSID. Because of increased FTAs, it is natural that there would
be a lot of disputes among the nations joining FTAs. In some cases, the two parties in
dispute have solved them bilaterally. But in other cases, the two parties have brought
them to third party „arbitrators.‟ Just as there is the dispute settlement body in WTO, a
dispute settlement mechanism is usually established between the nations joining a FTA.
In this thesis, I examine the cases filed to the ICSID which is one of international
arbitration institutions. The main purpose of the ICSID is to provide facilities for
conciliation and arbitration of international investment disputes. Throughout examining
the cases, the main focuses are; What is the purpose of the ICSID? How does the ICSID
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consist of? Do the nationalities of the judges affect its rulings? Are they impartial on their
rulings? These questions are addressed in Chapter 4.
Chapter 5 is conclusion part summarizing the findings and implications. And
some possible research areas in the future are suggested.

12

Chapter 2
Theoretical Review: Autonomy and Independence of International
Institutions
To evaluate the autonomy and independence of international institutions, this
chapter examines theoretical arguments from realism and institutional liberalism as they
are the two main theoretical approaches used in explaining international relations. These
two paradigms give us broad but conflicting perspectives on the issues of autonomy and
independence of international institutions. I analyze FTAs and dispute settlement based
on these two paradigms. The assumptions of realism and institutional liberalism
pertaining to the issue are discussed in order to set a foundation for further analysis.

I. Definition of autonomy and independence of international institutions.
To begin with, what does autonomy and independence of international institutions
mean? Autonomy, according to Haftel and Thompson (2006), is a key element of any
conceptualization of political independence. And they define independence for an
international organization as the ability to operate in a manner that is insulated from the
influence of other political actors- especially states. They suggest three important
institutional design features for measuring international organization independence; 1)
decision making, 2) supranational bureaucracy, and 3) dispute settlement. And they
propose two indicators in the form of questions for each feature. First, decision-making
procedures: 1) Are decisions made by majority rule? 2) Does a council of ministers hold
13

decision-making power? Second, supranational (regional) bureaucracy; 1) Is there a
permanent secretariat? 2) Can the secretariat make recommendations or initiate? And
third, 1) Is there a binding dispute settlement mechanism? 2) Is there a standing tribunal?
(Haftel and Thompson, 2006).
Abbott and Snidal (1998) define independence as the ability to act with a degree
of autonomy within defined spheres. Independence often entails the capacity to operate as
a neutral in managing interstate disputes and conflicts. They argue that if there is a
centralized secretariat in an international organization, then it has some operational
autonomy. And independence in an international organization enables it to shape
understandings, influence the terms of state interactions, elaborate norms, and mediate or
resolve member states‟ disputes (Abbott and Snidal, 1998).
In considering all the components shown in the definitions above, if there is
independence, there should be a certain degree of autonomy without other outer influence
or power. Accordingly in my thesis, I go over the autonomy and independence of the
ICSID in four ways. First, does power politics affect the Compositions of Tribunals? By
examining the selection of arbitrators in those Tribunals, I will be able to answer to the
question.
Second, how do the Compositions of Tribunals affect the winning outcomes in the
ICSID? If the Tribunals with more arbitrators from developed countries make decisions
in favor of developed countries, then the ICSID may be partially influenced by great
powers in making decisions. By analyzing the winning outcomes of developed countries
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in arbitration proceedings, we will be able to know whether the Compositions of the
Tribunals matter in the decisions by the ICSID.
Third, I also analyze the duration (proceeding period) of each party category.
Especially if the average duration in the cases of developed country (a Requesting Party)
vs. developing country (Respondent) is far longer than the average duration in the cases
of developing (a Requesting Party) vs. developed country (Respondent), the ICSID may
be influenced by great powers in arbitration proceedings. By comparing the average
durations, we will be able to know whether the ICSID is affected by power politics.
Finally, by studying the compliance of the losing parties to ICSID awards, we will
be able to know whether, especially, the autonomy of the ICSID is respected by the
Contracting States.
Considering all the findings resulting from examining the four categories above,
we will be able to know whether the autonomy and independence of the ICSID are well
maintained or not.
Now the assumptions of the two perspectives in relation with autonomy and
independence of international institutions are discussed in the next section.

II. Perspective from Realism
Realists argue that states are the primary actors in world politics. They admit that
international organizations play their roles, but still the roles played by international
organizations are, in most cases, dictated by powerful states‟ interests. In other words, the
role of international organizations is marginal in world politics when compared to the role
15

played by state power. From realists‟ perspective, it is natural to think that independence
and autonomy of international organizations could be influenced by, especially power
states.
Morgenthau (1948) emphasizes the centrality of states with not being affected by
institutions, rather using institutions for their interests in the world politics. He claims in
his book, Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, that judicial
methods cannot settle the disputes which are most likely to lead to war. When over-all
distribution of power between two nations is at stake, then there is no room where
judicial methods can affect the behaviors of the two nations concerned. States tend to use
international courts as the tools for their national interests regardless of the legitimacy of
cases that they bring to the courts. If the ruling is in favor of one nation, and not in favor
of the other, then the former is willing to accept the rulings and the latter is not. Therefore
Morgenthau suggests that although there are international institutions like international
courts and laws, they are, in fact, used for national interests by the parties concerned
(Morgenthau, 1948). Morgenthau (1951) again shows that states give priority to their
national interests rather than to international institutions by suggesting two examples, the
United Nations and the Yalta Agreement.
Morgenthau (1951) argues in his book, In Defense of the National Interest, that
international institutions are not able to make a substantial contribution to the peaceful
settlement of conflicts among the great powers. He looks at the United Nations as legal
forum in world politics. However, the United Nations is at best used as the channels of
national policies, especially of the great powers‟. According to his argument,
16

international institutions like the United Nations do not have substantial influence on the
great powers‟ behavior in world politics. He also uses the example of the violation of the
Yalta Agreement by the Soviet Union to show that such agreement can be broken when
the interests of the great powers like the Soviet Union are at stake. So he maintains that
success of international institutions like the United Nations or international agreements
like the Yalta Agreement is contingent on whether the national interests of the great
powers are at stake (Morgenthau, 1951).
By emphasizing relative gain problem in international politics, Grieco (1988) also
argues that though international institutions may give absolute gains to each state from a
joint arrangement, states are more concerned about the relative gains that other states gain.
By pointing the core assumptions and differences between realism and liberal
institutionalism, Grieco (1988) reaffirms that states are the main actors in world politics
and international institutions‟ influence on the prospects for cooperation is marginal.
States are concerned about the relative gains of other states when they cooperate in a joint
arrangement. States‟ core interest is survival. Therefore, though the absolute gains are
guaranteed in a joint arrangement, states can be reluctant to cooperate when such
arrangement makes disproportionate gains where one gains more than the other from
joining the arrangement. And like other realists, he also assumes that states, rather than
international institutions, are primary behaviors in international politics (Grieco, 1988).
Grieco (1993) points out different views between realism and neoliberalism such
as interpreting the influence of anarchy on states behavior. And he again emphasizes the
importance of relative gains in international politics which have not been valued as much
17

as realists have. And throughout his argument, he still regards states as the main actors in
world politics, though he, in part, admits that realists need help from other theories in
order to interpret emerging phenomena such as EC‟s revitalization which cannot be easily
explained by the current realism arguments (Grieco 1993).
Waltz (2000), one of the prominent realists, again emphasized realism‟s
explanatory power even today. Waltz (2000) reaffirms that realism is still applicable in
present days by representing the continued existence and expansion of NATO. There is a
different, almost opposite, interpretation on the continued existence and expansion of
NATO between realists and institutionalists. Institutionalists use the case as the evidence
of robustness of their theory while realists, by using the case, interpret that international
institutions are constrained by powerful states and the institutions have little independent
effect. He even maintains that NATO is an example showing international institutions‟
subordination to national purpose which is supported by realists. In short, Waltz says like
other realists that international institutions including NATO serve the interests of
powerful states (Waltz, 2000).
Mearsheimer (1994) argues that theories such as liberal institutionalism,
collective security, and critical theory, have little empirical evidence to support their
theories. He even suggests that the historical evidence that institutional theorists use to
support their theories is not, in fact, supporting their theories, but realism instead. The
reason why institutional theories are attractive and sustained in American elites and the
American people is that these theories are in accordance with basic American values
according to Mearsheimer. He points out that institutional theories have little explanatory
18

power to describe the world. Since they often also have problems making concrete
predictions about the future, another component is necessary for sound theory. As a
result, institutional theorists cannot provide proper solutions to promote peace and
cooperation.
Mearsheimer argues realists view institutions as the reflection of power
distribution in the world and institutions are affected by the great powers and great power
interests, not vice versa. Therefore institutions have little influence on changing state
behavior. Further, he argues that realism has been the dominant theory for centuries and
will be likely to remain the dominant theory in international relations. In short,
institutional theorists with institutional solutions in world politics have failed to influence
on state behavior and to replace realism (Mearsheimer, 1994).
Realists argue that states behaviors cannot be changed by international
organizations. States will change their behaviors only if the outcomes affected by the
functions of international organizations fit in with states‟ interests. Mearsheimer received
lots of responses from institutional liberalists and constructivists (Keohane and Martin,
1995; Ruggie, 1995; Wendt, 1995).
First of all, Ruggie (1995) suggests three counterpoints to the Mearsheimer‟s
analysis. First, after World War II, U.S. policymakers did not accept the antiinstitutionalism that Mearsheimer would have us adopt. Second, if postwar U.S.
policymakers accepted his views, then the international security environment would be
quite different. Third, some U.S. policymakers‟ unfavorable view of realism was from
their understanding of a distinctive feature of America‟s geopolitical situation. To these
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counterpoints, Mearsheimer (1995) replies that Ruggie does not address the core issue
about institutions raised in “False Promise.” That is, the question: can institutions cause
peace by independently affecting state behavior? According to Mearsheimer, realists‟
answer to the question is no. Furthermore Mearsheimer (1995) adds that Ruggie does not
provide strong support for institutionalist theory.
Second, Keohane and Martin(1995) argue that international institutions have
sometimes significant impact on state behavior by pointing to some international
institutions like NATO‟s role in terms of peace keeping in Europe and the influence of
the European community, now the European Union (EU), demonstrated during the
Falklands War. Furthermore they maintain that these institutions are expanding their
memberships which can be the evidence suggesting state leaders are being influenced by
institutionalism (Keohane and Martin, 1995). In response to their arguments,
Mearsheimer (1995) replies that liberal institutionalism is realism by another name and
the two institutions are, after all, used by great powers for their interests. He admits that
institutions sometimes matter. Consequently states invest their resources in institutions.
However, they do so not because institutions can affect the behaviors of states, but
because the function of institutions is in favor of the states. In brief, states are willing to
invest their resources in institutions only when their national interests are guaranteed by
doing so.
Third, Wendt (1995) counterpoints that with the increase of shared knowledge in
social structure in world politics, states can promote peace and cooperation believing that
shared knowledge can change state behavior. He asserts that the time has come to replace
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realism in the dominant position of international politics with the growing reliance of
realists on social factors to do their explanatory work. To this, Mearsheimer (1995)
replies to him that Wendt is deeply concerned with changing state behavior, but he does
not say much about how change will come about. Mearsheimer (1995) also argues that
although the discourse which can replace realism appears, Wendt cannot know it will be
more benign than realism. Mearsheimer (1995) maintains that until the critical theory
shows enough empirical evidence to support the theory, realism will remain in the
dominant position of international relations literature. That is, states, - not institutions nor
shared knowledge, - will continue to be the main actors in international politics.
The core question between realists and institutionalists, Mearsheimer (1995)
argues, is whether international institutions can prevent war by changing state behavior.
To this core question, the answer from realists is no while the answer from
institutionalists yes. Both realists and institutionalists agree that states invest their
resources in international institutions. However, realists think that international
institutions reflect states‟ self-interests based on relative gains. Consequently, the
outcomes also reflect balance of power. Realists suggest that great powers use
international institutions to further their self-interests and to gain more in relative power
position in world politics. Therefore, international institutions have little independent
effects on state behavior. Institutionalists, however, maintain that international
institutions can change state behavior independently and can cause peace which is
contrary to the realists‟ perspective. Mearsheimer points out the lack of empirical
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evidence for institutionalists to support their argument and shows some historical cases
which make institutionalists theory vulnerable (Mearsheimer, 1995)
Realists, therefore, suggest that states act based on their interests in world politics.
And states are the main actors in world politics. Although there are lots of international
institutions, the roles played by the institutions do not have power enough to change
states‟ behaviors. Conversely they think of them as tools used by great powers pursuing
their national interests.
Realism has been a dominant theory in international relations for a long time.
However, to avoid having partial perspective on international institutions in world
politics, it is important to review the other main stream called institutional liberalism
which has a different view of international institutions.

III. Perspective from Institutional Liberalism
Realists and institutional liberalists agree that this world is under anarchy. That is,
there is no international government which can enforce international laws and monitor
whether nation states keep agreements. This situation makes international cooperation
difficult to achieve. However, institutional liberalists argue that international cooperation
is not impossible. If so, what makes international cooperation possible? They suggest that
international organizations can play important roles by providing some benefits and
removing obstacles to international cooperation. Axelrod and Keohane (1985) explain
them well in their article, „Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and
Institutions‟
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Achieving cooperation seems difficult under anarchy. However, it is not
impossible. Axelrod and Keohane (1985) suggest that international cooperation is
affected by three factors. That is, mutuality of interests, the shadow of the future, and the
number of actors. First, Payoff structure affects international cooperation differently in
different types of games such as Prisoners‟ Dilemma, Stag Hunt, and Chicken. They
argue perceptions define interests. So it is important to know how interests are perceived
and how preferences are determined accordingly. Second, international cooperation
becomes more feasible by the shadow of the future. It is based on the assumption that
when the future payoffs are valued, defection is not favored by actors. When a game is
iterated, actors should consider the consequences of defection. This logic makes
international cooperation more feasible. Third, the number of actors is also important
factor influencing international cooperation. It becomes difficult to identify defectors and
monitor defections when the number of actors is increasing. Consequently, incentives to
cooperate decrease. In order to solve these problems, they suggest international regimes.
Regimes can provide a lot of benefits for international cooperation by providing
information about actors‟ compliance, facilitating the development and maintenance of
reputations, being incorporated into actors‟ rules of thumb for responding to others‟
actions and apportioning responsibility for decentralized enforcement of rules. Axelrod
and Keohane (1985) emphasize the importance of international institutions which can
alter the payoff structures facing actors, and may even lengthen the shadow of the future.
For example, although one player can defect the others one time in one-time game, it will
no longer be attractive in iterated games. The defector should be concerned about the
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results when there are the possibilities that others can defect in iterated games.
Consequently, all players had better cooperate in the long run. Furthermore they may
divide N-person games into games with smaller numbers of actors. So they argue that
international institutions are effective in removing obstacles to international cooperation
(Axelrod and Keohane, 1985).
Keohane, Robert, and Martin (1995) dispute realists‟ argument that international
organizations have just marginal effect on state behavior by suggesting some
international organizations as evidences. In their article, they reject Mearsheimer‟s
arguments against institutionalist theory. They argue that institutions can promote
cooperation by dealing with distributional conflicts and providing information to states
such as military expenditures and capabilities of alliance members. And they suggest the
European Union, NATO, GATT, European Court of Justice, and regional trading
organizations influence on state behavior and can facilitate stability and peace in the
world. It is contrary to the realists‟ argument that international institutions have just a
marginal effect on state behavior and are usually affected by the powerful states‟ selfinterests. Institutionalists maintain that it is worthwhile to do research on international
institutions and the promise of institutionalist theory is likely (Keohane, Robert, and Lisa
L. Martin, 1995). For US foreign policy, Ruggie (1995) also suggests that some
international institutions play important roles.
As mentioned before, Ruggie (1995), in response to Mearsheimer‟s analysis of
institutionalism, points out important roles of institutionalist in terms of U.S. foreign
policy. He argues that although realism was proper in describing the postwar world, it
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failed to understand the integral role of institutions in U.S. foreign policy. For example,
Ruggie suggests the important roles of a few institutions such as UN, NATO, and
European unification which are usually ignored or underestimated by realists. Despite the
realists‟ objections to adopting institutionalism in American history, especially in foreign
policies, there have been many statesmen who tried to embody and apply institutionalist
perspective in world politics. In addition, he maintains that it is better to have institutions,
though they seem to have weak influence, than not to have them at all. In short, he argues
institutionalism should guide U.S. foreign policy, not realism which has serious and
dangerous limits (Ruggie, 1995).
However, even powerful states can have some benefits although there may be
some disadvantages when working through international organizations. Thompson (2006)
specifies this by highlighting the US‟ effort to gain the approval from the Security
Council before the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Thompson answers the question, „Why do
powerful states often channel coercive policies through international organizations
(IOs)?‟ His answer to this question is focused on the notion of strategic information
transmission. By channeling coercive policies through IOs, powerful states can have
some benefits such as gaining support from the international community and sending
more credible information that can be used to reduce domestic opposition in each
country. Of course, there are also some disadvantages when channeling coercive policies
through IOs. For example, coercing states may face freedom-of-action costs, organization
costs, costs of delay, and security costs. Despite these disadvantages, some states turn to
IOs such as the UN expecting more benefits from them. In order to support the argument,
25

the author suggests a case study of the 1990~91 Gulf War. At that time, the US could
have operated without the approval from the Security Council. But the US chose to gain
the approval from the Security Council. Although the US risked some loss of autonomy
and limited goals, it could achieve international support and reduced domestic opposition
in other countries that were, otherwise, hard to gain. Throughout the article, Thompson
emphasizes the important role of IOs as a strategic information transmitter especially
when powerful states channel coercive policies through IOs. In short, he shows that IOs
can play an important role in world politics, have independence, have relative autonomy
and neutrality, and change even powerful states‟ behaviors (Thompson, 2006).
In economic sectors, Ruggie (1982) suggests the important role of the postwar
regimes for trade and money. He argues that international authority reflects a fusion of
power and legitimate social purpose. Focusing his argument on international economic
transactions flows, he concludes that the postwar regimes for trade and money do play a
mediating role. In short, he also views international regimes as influential in world
politics since they can affect states‟ behavior, especially in economic sectors. He
maintains that international economic regimes provide a permissive environment for the
emergence of specific kinds of international transaction flows (Ruggie, 1982).
In 1982, Keohane already pointed out the demand for international regimes by
pointing to the benefits that international regimes could provide in world politics.
Keohane emphasizes the necessity and functions of regimes by presenting the benefits
regimes can provide for actors in world politics. He argues that firms face three specific
problems such as asymmetric information, moral hazard, and deception and
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irresponsibility. And these are also serious problems that governments in world politics
are facing. Consequently this situation results in demands for international regimes to
reduce these problems. International regimes provide governments in world politics with
reduced organization costs and other transactions costs and information that is useful in
reaching bargains between states. In addition, through institutionalized arrangements,
members in regimes could decrease harmful externalities and uncertainty. By providing
rules, norms, principles, and procedures, regimes also facilitate agreements (Keohane,
1982).
Constructivism is also in a similar standpoint like institutional liberalism. Ruggie
(1998) is one of the scholars focusing on ideational factors in world politics. He directs
our attention to the emergence of social constructivism which focuses on ideational
factors in international relations. He asserts that such ideational factors can shape actors‟
outlooks and behavior in culture, ideology, aspirations, and principled beliefs. In contrast,
realists believe that states‟ identities and interests are given and fixed. He argues that
constructivists are concerned about or emphasize human consciousness in international
life. These ideational factors present themselves as individual and collective intentionality
(Ruggie, 1998). In general, like other institutional liberalists, he also maintains that
states‟ behavior can be affected by these ideational factors.
Keohane (1998) argues that even the most powerful states are relying on
international institutions. Scholars agree that relative state power and competing interests
are the key factors in world politics. However, he points out the influence of institutions
in world politics. There are advantages that institutions can provide for states like
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reducing „transaction costs‟, reinforcing practices of reciprocity, reducing the uncertainty
of enforcing agreements. Even powerful states can have interests by following the rules
of international institutions, as following rules makes the behavior of other states more
predictable. In short, he asserts that international institutions can help states achieve
collective gains by making it easier to see how other states behave in the future and
reduce „transaction costs‟. To solve the problem of a democratic deficit in international
institutions, he suggests that it is necessary to encourage the formation of transnational
society networks among individuals and nongovernmental organizations. Thanks to
development of advanced technology such as the Internet, the number of such networks is
growing. Keohane expects that official actions will be reviewed by transnational
networks. He sees international institutions important to be effective even in the twentyfirst century (Keohane, 1998).
Wendt (1995) also recognizes the role of international institutions since they can
promote security and peace in international society as mentioned before. Wendt, a
constructivist, argues that social structures constructed by shared knowledge and ideas
have impact on the shape of international system. They could have either positive or
negative impact on the system. Unlike realists, social structures can attribute to security
community through agency and shared knowledge. In this regard, he also points out the
important role of institutions in promoting security and peace in international society.
Although the realists like Mearsheimer suggest that states cannot be 100 percent certain
of others‟ intentions, it does not mean that war occurs any time. He agrees with the
realists‟ view on the assumption that states are under anarchy. However, the security
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dilemma can be addressed in social structures which consist of shared knowledge and
ideas, not solely by states‟ egoistic identities and interests which are maintained by the
realists. That is, international security and peace can be facilitated by social structures and
this situation could result in increased role of international institutions. As a result, he
argues that ideas matter in international society (Wendt, 1995).
Martin (1992) also recognizes the importance of international institutions because
they can be solutions to dilemmas of strategic interaction. She explains four categorized
problems and suggests solutions to each problem. They are collaboration, coordination,
suasion, and assurance problems. Like other institutional liberalists, she also points out
the importance of institutions in that a far-sighted state may choose to rely on the
institution of multilateralism or multilateral organizations rather than using its unilateral
power to solve cooperation problems (Martin, 1992).
So far in Chapter 2, the perspectives of realism, institutional liberalism, and
constructivism on international institutions have been discussed. In brief, realists argue
that states are the main actors in world politics and they act based on their interests. They
recognize the existence of international institutions, but they think that the role played by
international institutions is at best marginal. Therefore international institutions cannot
affect state behavior. On the contrary, institutional liberalists maintain that international
institutions can play important roles in lots of areas in world politics. Even they can affect
and change state behavior. They also represent historical and institutional evidence to
support their arguments. As for social constructivists, they are also in line with
institutional liberalists in that they recognize the important roles played by international
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institutions. Both realists and institutional liberalists agree that states are still main actors
in world politics. In the next section, some literature related to international economy and
dispute settlement institutions is discussed with respect to their autonomy and
independence.

IV. Empirical Findings of Autonomy and Independence of International Institutions
It is important for an international institution to keep its autonomy and
independence from outside influences. As a type of international institution, it is the same
with an international law organization. Impartiality of international judges in such
organizations is, therefore, essential. However, they are also nationals in certain countries.
Therefore, one may well think of the influence of their culture or geopolitical biases on
the rulings by the international judges.
Regarding this matter, Voeten (2008) also agrees with the statement that
impartiality of international judges is important. However, can international judges make
a judgment impartially? Answering to this question, he analyzed the cases of the
European Court of Human Rights. He got a mixed set of answers. On one side, there is no
evidence that the international judges systematically employ cultural or geopolitical
biases in their rulings. However, there is some evidence that career insecurities make the
judges more likely to favor their national government when it is a party to a dispute. He
concludes that the overall picture is positive for the possibility of impartial review of
government behavior by judges on an international court (Voeten, 2008). Although the
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overall picture is positive, it is notable that he shows that in some cases, the rulings by the
judges with career insecurities can be biased.
In addition to career insecurities, Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla (2008) suggest that
political constraint can affect the judicial behavior. They analyzed the cases of the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in respect of judicial behavior under political
constraints. In their study of judicial behavior under political constraints, they evaluated
whether and to what extent such constraints shape judicial rulings. The two major
constraints are noncompliance and legislative override. Judges at ECJ are sensitive to
these two constraints. The political threats have a large influence on the rulings by judges
at ECJ. When considering which threat is more influential on the rulings, the results show
that the threats of noncompliance are more influential than threats of override. In brief,
their findings show that the preferences of member-state governments have a systematic
and substantively important impact on ECJ decisions (Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla,
2008).
The factors influencing international law organizations can be found not only in
the European Court of Human Rights and ECJ, but also in the WTO. Busch and
Reinhardt (2006) argue that third parties influence the course of negotiations before a
ruling is issued in the WTO. When other members, not the parties concerned in a dispute,
can establish that they have a „substantial trade interest in the dispute, then they can be
joined in consultations. However, they suggest that when third parties are involved in a
dispute, the prospects for early settlement become less likely and a case is likely to go to
a ruling. They also find that third parties wield more influence in a dispute before they are
31

formally recognized in consultations. In short, they insist that third-party participation is
the most important influence on early settlement (Busch and Reinhardt, 2006).
When some factors influence the rulings by international judges like the ones
mentioned above, states may be reluctant to accept all the rulings made by such judges.
However, there are also cases that states are willing to accept more. If so, what is the
cause that makes states willing to accept rulings?
Zangl (2008) argues that judicialization of international dispute settlement
procedures (IDSPs) can contribute to states‟ compliance with these dispute settlement
mechanisms. He analyzed the disputes between the United States and the EU under
GATT and the WTO respectively. He assumes that the dispute settlement procedures
under GATT are diplomatic while the dispute settlement procedures under the WTO, are
judicial. And in general, the findings show that states tend to be more compliant with
judicialized IDSPs under the WTO than with diplomatic IDSPs under GATT. Regarding
the effectiveness of judicial IDSPs in making states comply with the procedures,
institutionalists point out two reasons. First, states may perceive judicial IDSPs as more
legitimate than diplomatic IDSPs because they institutionalize the principle of impartial
treatment of alleged breaches of international law. Second, states may perceive judicial
IDSPs more reliable than diplomatic IDSPs because they are better in dealing with
breaches of international law. These institutionalists‟ conjectures seem to fare well in
comparing and analyzing the disputes between the United States and the EU under GATT
or the WTO. And he concludes that although there should be caution in seeing that an
international rule of law follows almost automatically from the establishment of
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judicialized dispute settlement procedures, the international rule of law is gradually
emerging (Zangl, 2008). However, it seems that the rulings made under GATT/WTO
have favored developed countries more than developing ones. That is, developed
countries have been the beneficiaries more than developing ones under the rulings of
GATT/WTO.
Busch and Reinhardt (2003) argue that the conventional wisdom that developing
countries were not served well by GATT and are now better served by the WTO‟s more
legalistic system is wrong on both counts. By analyzing the dataset of 380 concluded
GATT/WTO disputes filed from 1 January 1980 to 31 December 2000, they show that in
fact, wealthy complainants have secured their desired outcomes more frequently than
poorer complainants under the WTO. That is, rich complainants are in better positions to
get defendants to concede before a ruling is issued than poor complainants. They suggest
that since the rule of law system does not guarantee efficient outcomes, one needs an
adequate level of legal capacity and expertise to realize it (Busch and Reinhardt, 2003).
In a similar line with Busch and Reinhardt (2003), Kim (2008) also argues that
developed countries have gained desired outcomes more frequently than developing ones
due to institutional differences between the GATT to the WTO. He argues that countries
with higher administrative capacities, usually developed countries, can have more
benefits of increased legalization than countries with lower administrative capacities. And
he maintains that developed countries are more likely to use dispute settlement in the
WTO than developing countries compared to the GATT era. Therefore, the gains from
the institutional changes in dispute settlement procedures have benefited developed
33

countries more than developing countries in the WTO although the dispute settlement
procedures became better integrated, compulsory, automatic, more precise, and more
efficient. From the GATT to the WTO, the institutional changes in the dispute settlement
procedures increased the procedural costs for member states and the procedural rules
have become more complex and extensive. Further, it requires member states to have
greater capacity to address administrative burdens and greater expertise in the WTO
procedural law. This makes developing countries hesitate to utilize the dispute settlement
procedures in the WTO. Developed countries, however, do not usually care about
utilizing the procedures as much as developing countries have since they usually have
such administrative capacities and expertise (Kim, 2008).
In general, international law organizations are not free from influences and effects
for many reasons like above. To keep the autonomy and independence of international
law organizations is desired by most of the member states, but it is not easy to keep them
from outer influences. Having reviewed the related literatures, the dispute settlement
mechanism in FTAs is discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
The Dispute Settlement Mechanism in FTAs
I. The Expansion of FTAs
Recently many states have increased the number of FTAs they sign in order to
widen their international trade markets and not to remain isolated from preferential trade
benefits from joining FTAs. By mid-2004, according to the World Bank, there were 229
Free Trade Agreements in force worldwide, and 174 countries have signed at least one
(Medvedev, 2006). This figure is definitely growing in number even at this moment. The
WTO requires the member states to report any outside trade agreements that they sign to
the organization. As of Aug. 2010, 165 FTAs have been submitted to the organization
(WTO, 2010). However, all the FTAs signed by WTO member states are not reported.
Therefore there should be more FTAs signed than the figure reported to the WTO
indicates.
In Asia and the Pacific, there were 227 FTAs in 2009. Among them are 112
concluded, 60 under negotiation and 55 proposed according to the Asian Development
Bank (ADB, 2009). As of July 2010, there are 98 FTAs of all sorts in Latin America
except for multilateral agreement in force from Canada down to Chile according to the
Organization of American States (OAS, 2010)
With the increased investment provisions added to bilateral and regional
preferential trade agreements, the international system of investment rules is growing at a
fast pace. According to UNCTAD, at the beginning of 2007, the total number of all
investment-related agreements including bilateral investment treaties, double taxation
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treaties and free trade agreements with investment provisions were 5,500, and this total
was growing at a rate of three per week. Consequently, the current international system of
investment rules is characterized as atomized, complex, multi-layered, multi-faceted, only
slightly transparent, and rapidly evolving (UNCTAD, 2007). According to the degree of
economic integration, the WTO has divided RTAs into four types. They are „Preferential
Trade Agreements, Free Trade Agreements, Customs Unions, and Economic Integration
Agreements‟. Free Trade Agreement is in the first place in number. (See the list of all
RTAs in force, by type of agreement in the WTO website at
http://rtais.wto.org/UI/publicPreDefRepByRTAType.aspx).
Figure 2 based on the above website shows all the Free Trade Agreements
notified to WTO by year.

Figure 2. Free Trade Agreements notified to WTO by Year

Source: http://www.wto.org
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FTAs are growing in number in the WTO system though all the FTAs are not
reported to the WTO. There are some benefits for joining FTAs. Urata (2002) suggests
that there are external and internal factors for the surge in FTAs. As for external factors,
markets can be secured and FTAs can provide domestic companies with export
opportunities. As for internal factors, FTAs will lead to economic growth from increased
efficiency due to greater competition generated from such FTAs. He also represents four
main reasons for the surge of FTAs. First, FTAs are faster than multilateral agreements
represented by the WTO. That is, less time is required in FTAs than trade liberalization
under the WTO. Second, there are growing anti-global protestors against multilateral
trade under the WTO. Therefore states are turning to FTAs as an alternative way to
achieve trade liberalization and to avoid negative reaction from groups opposed to the
WTO. Third, since there are too many members in the WTO, it is not easy to establish
rules for new issues, but it is quite easier in FTAs. Finally, states, especially powerful
states, want to strengthen their political and economic influence in the international arena
through making FTAs (Urata, 2002).
For these reasons, FTAs driven usually by great powers like the US, EU and
Japan have expanded recently around the world and are likely to expand more at a fast
pace in the future. As a result, trade disputes are occurring from those bilateral
agreements between the states involved. Sometimes such disputes can be resolved
bilaterally. However, there are also disputes that cannot be resolved bilaterally, and the
parties in the disputes sometimes go to arbitration institutions according to the related
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provisions specified in FTAs. In the next section, bilateral dispute mechanisms are
compared to multilateral dispute mechanisms.

II. Multilateral and Bilateral Dispute Settlement Mechanism
Since one state‟s interests in international trade are different from another‟s and
their interpretation of agreements may vary case by case, it is natural for trade disputes in
multilateral and bilateral agreements to occur. Therefore states set up dispute settlement
articles within such agreements. It is important for states involved in the agreements to
make dispute settlement articles clear for possible disputes. In general, bilateral dispute
settlement mechanisms are in most aspects similar with and follow the examples
represented by the multilateral dispute settlement in the WTO. Of course, there are also
some different characteristics in these two mechanisms. First, the dispute settlement
mechanism in the WTO is discussed.
The dispute settlement mechanism in the WTO represents multilateralism. The
decision making function and procedures in the mechanism is based on consensus from
all the WTO member states. The WTO procedure also emphasizes the rule of law. The
panel in the WTO makes rulings, and the rulings can be endorsed or rejected by the
WTO‟s full membership. If the complaining party is not satisfied with a ruling, then the
party can appeal based on points of law. In the old GATT, there was also a procedure for
dispute settlements. But there were some shortcomings in the procedures. First, there
were no fixed timetables. Second, although rulings were made, they were easily blocked
by the parties. Third, because of no timetables, many cases were prolonged in settling
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disputes without a decision ever being reached. In order to improve these situations, the
WTO member states made some revisions through the Uruguay Round agreement. The
Uruguay Round agreement set the length of time within which a case should be settled. If
a case is taken to the full course, it should not take more than one year. If the case is
appealed, then no more than 15 months. However, if the case needs to be settled in urgent
time such as perishable goods, it is accelerated. Another improved part through the
Uruguay Round agreement is that the country losing a case cannot block the adoption of
the ruling. In the old GATT procedure, this was possible. But it is no longer possible
unless there is a consensus to reject a ruling. It means that if a country wants to block a
ruling, then it has to persuade all other WTO members, even its adversary in the dispute.
Therefore it is impossible to block the adoption of the ruling once a ruling is made. Table
3 shows the approximate periods for each stage of a dispute settlement in the WTO.

Table 3. Periods for Each Stage of Dispute Settlement in the WTO
Periods

Each Stage of Dispute Settlement

60 days

Consultations, mediation, etc

45 days

Panel set up and panelists appointed

6 months

Final panel report to parties

3 weeks

Final panel report to WTO members

60 days

Dispute Settlement Body adopts report (if no appeal)

Total = 1 year

(without appeal)

60-90 days

Appeals report
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Periods

Each Stage of Dispute Settlement

30 days

Dispute Settlement Body adopts appeals report

Total = 1y 3m

(with appeal)

Source: http://www.wto.org (Periods are approximate)

In general, since settling disputes without passing judgments by themselves are
encouraged, consultations and mediations are the first stage and will always possible
throughout dispute settling procedures. The Consultation period is up to 60 days. The
parties in a dispute are encouraged to settle the case. But if it fails, then they can ask the
WTO director-general to mediate the case. If the settlement by the two parties and the
mediation by the WTO director-general fail, the complaining party can ask for a panel to
be appointed. 45 days are set for a panel to be appointed and 6 months are allowed for the
panel to conclude the case. The creation of a panel can be blocked just once and no
longer be blocked when the Dispute Settlement Body meets for a second time. Within 6
months, the panel should give its final report to the parties, and three weeks later, it is
circulated to all WTO members. If there is no appeal from the parties, it is impossible to
overturn the final report, because it can be rejected only by consensus of all WTO
members. The panelists are usually chosen from a permanent list of well-qualified
candidates by agreement from the parties in dispute. They examine the evidence and
decide who is right or wrong in their individual capacities. No government can affect
panels‟ decision making.
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When one of the parties in dispute is not satisfied with the final report by a panel,
it can appeal the panel‟s ruling based on points of law such as legal interpretation. The
Appellate Body consists of seven permanent members. When a party is dissatisfied with
the final report by a panel appeal, three members of a permanent seven-member
Appellate Body in the WTO hear each appeal. It is the Dispute Settlement Body that
selects the three members. In order to keep its neutrality, they are not affiliated with any
government. They represent the WTO membership and have to be recognized in the field
of law and international trade. The Appellate Body‟s primary goal is to decide whether it
will uphold, modify, or reverse the panel‟s legal findings and conclusions. The decision
making period is not more than 60 days with an absolute maximum of 90 days. Once the
appeals report is made, the Dispute Settlement Body has to accept or reject within 30
days. Rejection is only possible by consensus. Figure 3 shows the flow of dispute
settlement in the WTO.
Most of the bilateral dispute settlement mechanisms are modeled from or based
on the multilateral dispute settlement mechanism adopted by the WTO. By the way, in
case WTO rights and obligations are at issue, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism
can be elevated over FTAs‟ dispute settlement mechanisms. Here are some FTAs „dispute
settlement mechanisms showing their similarities and differences in comparison with the
dispute settlement mechanism in the WTO. First, the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement
mechanism is also based on the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).
However, there are also minor differences. Panel reports are adopted at the Senior
Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM). Its role is like the one of the WTO Dispute
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Figure 3. Flow of Dispute Settlement in the WTO
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Settlement Body. And a reverse-consensus rule applies in the SEOM. ASEAN economic
ministers appoint a seven-member Appellate Body. Second, Japan-Singapore Economic
general consultations to avoid recourse to the dispute settlement system. Especially
JSEPS allow the parties to have recourse to other internal dispute settlement agreements
such as the WTO to which they are parties. Third, North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) has Chapter 20 which applies to NAFTA disputes. The members
are required to resolve Chapter 20 disputes through government-to-government
consultations. If it fails, a meeting of the NAFTA Free Trade Commission can be
requested by the parties. If it also fails, a party may call for the establishment of a fivemember arbitral panel. NAFTA members can choose to resolve trade disputes through
arbitration with the FTA or before the WTO (ADB, 2008).
In general, the dispute settlement mechanisms of FTAs are based on the WTO
dispute settlement mechanisms. However, some differences also exist. One of the
distinguished characteristics in FTAs is its exclusiveness to the parties in FTAs. That is,
the dispute between the parties in an FTA is basically state-to-state dispute. Because of its
exclusiveness, the parties are usually able to shorten the dispute settlement period though
the degree of the decision effects after the settlement vary depending on agreements.
Disputes in FTAs can be settled bilaterally if consultations between the parties succeed,
or the parties in dispute can have recourse to the Dispute Settlement Body in the WTO if
both of them are WTO members.
However, there have been also many cases which came to a standstill after all the
efforts from each side have been tried. When the parties have no option to settle disputes,
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then they can have recourse to international arbitration institutions. The International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) is one of the institutions. The
number of cases registered under the ICSID Convention and additional facility rules is
not large, but it has begun to rise sharply in the late 1990s. As the number of FTAs in the
world is increasing, the number of the cases registered under ICSID Convention and
additional facility rules will also increase. Therefore it is important to study how the
ICSID works and to know whether its autonomy and independence are well maintained in
its standings which is the main focus in this thesis. The next chapter deals with structure
of the ICSID and its concluded cases which are also important parts of this thesis.
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Chapter 4
ICSID
I. Structure
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) is an
autonomous international institution with the purpose to provide facilities for conciliation
and arbitration of international investment disputes. It was established under the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States (the ICSID or the Washington Convention). It was entered into force on
October 14, 1966. ICSID provides facilities for the resolution of legal disputes between
eligible parties through conciliation or arbitration procedures and plays an important role
in the field of international investment and economic development (See the ICSID
website http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp).
The ICSID consists of an Administrative Council that is the governing body of the
ICSID and ICSID Secretariat. The Administrative Council is comprised of one
representative of each of the ICSID Contracting States, each having equal voting powers.
The Administrative Council elects the Secretary-General and the Deputy SecretaryGeneral, adopts regulations and rules for the institution and conduct of ICSID
proceedings, the ICSID budget, and approves the annual report on the operation of ICSID.
The Secretariat is comprised of a Secretary-General who is the legal representative of
ICSID, a Deputy Secretary-General who acts for the Secretary-General in his/her absence,
and staff. The Secretariat provides institutional support for the initiation and conduct of
the ICSID proceedings while maintaining the ICSID Panels of Conciliators and of
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Arbitrators. Each Contracting State may designate four persons and the Chairman of the
Administrative Council may designate 10 persons for the ICSID panels of conciliators
and of arbitrators. The parties to the ICSID proceedings may select conciliators and
arbitrators from the ICSID Panels (See the ICSID website). There are 208 arbitrators in
the ICSID. 199 arbitrators have been designated by the Contracting States and 9
arbitrators, are designated by the Chairman of the Administrative Council. Table 4 shows
the Nationalities of the ICSID Arbitrators designated by the Contracting States or by the
Chairman of the Administrative Council in the ICSID Arbitrator Panel. As seen in Table
4, the arbitrators from developing countries designated by the Contracting Country or by
the Chairman are more than the arbitrators from developed countries. Therefore there is
not much prevailing influence from great powers in the arbitration panel.

Table 4. Nationalities of the ICSID Arbitrators designated by the Contracting States or by
the Chairman of the Administrative Council in the ICSID Arbitrator Panel
Designated by the Contracting States or by the Chairman
Developed

91(43.75%)

Developing

117(56.25%)

Total

208(100%)

Source: http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet

The ICSID has two sets of procedural rules governing the initiation and conduct
of proceedings: the ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules and the ICSID Additional
Facility Rules. The ICSID Convention provides the basic procedural framework for
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conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between the qualified parties in dispute.
And the framework is supplemented by detailed Regulations and Rules. Once the parties
have agreed to receive arbitration and conciliation under the ICSID Convention, neither
may unilaterally withdraw it. In order for the parties in dispute to have access to
arbitration or conciliation under the ICSID Convention, there are several essential
jurisdictional conditions; the dispute must be between an ICSID Contracting State and an
individual or company that qualifies as a national of another ICSID Contracting State.
The dispute must qualify as a legal dispute arising directly out of an investment. The
disputing parties must have consented in writing to the submission of their dispute to the
ICSID arbitration or conciliation. The ICSID Additional Facility Rules are in place to
guide the ICSID Secretariat in administering certain types of proceedings between states
and foreign nationals which fall outside the scope of the Convention. As of January 7,
2010, 155 States have signed the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dispute
between States and Nationals of Other States. Of the 155 States, 144 States have
deposited their instruments of ratification attaining the status of Contracting State (See
the ICSID website at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp).
The proceedings of conciliation are conducted by the ICSID Convention,
Regulations, and Rules and the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. The official three
languages in the ICSID are English, French, and Spanish and they are equally authentic
(Regulation 34 of Administrative and Financial Regulations of the ICSID). The
Conciliation mechanism is designed to bring about agreement between the parties upon
mutually acceptable terms which is also the duty of the Commission (Article 34 of the
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ICSID Convention). The conciliation mechanism in the ICSID is as follows. Any
Contracting State or a national of a Contracting State wishing to institute conciliation
proceedings can send a written request to the Secretary-General. The request should
include information concerning the issues in dispute, the identity of the parties of the
dispute and their consent to conciliation in accordance with the rules of procedure for the
institution of conciliation and arbitration proceedings. The Secretary-General reviews the
request to see if it is inside the jurisdiction of the Centre. If so, the Secretary-General
registers the request and notifies the parties of registration. If not, the Secretary-General
refuses to register and also notifies the parties of refusal (Article 28 of the ICSID
Convention).
Upon registration of a request, the Conciliation Commission is constituted. The
Commission consists of a sole conciliator or any uneven number of conciliators
appointed as the parties agree. If the parties do not agree upon the number of conciliators
and the method of their appointment, the Commission consists of three conciliators, one
conciliator appointed by each party and the third appointed by agreement of the parties.
The third conciliator will be the president of the Commission (Article 29 of the ICSID
Convention). If the Commission is not constituted within 90 days, the Chairman will
appoint the conciliator or conciliators not yet appointed at the request of either party after
consulting both parties as much as possible (Article 30 of the ICSID Convention).
The Commission is the judge of its own competence (Article 32 of the ICSID
Convention) and clarifies the issues in dispute between the parties and facilitates
agreement between them by recommending terms of settlement to the parties at any stage
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of the proceedings. Within 60 days, the report of the Commission will be drawn up and
signed after the closure of the proceeding (Rule 31 of the Conciliation Rules). If the
parties reach agreement, a report notes the issues in dispute and records that the parties
have reached agreement. If there is no likelihood of agreement between the parties, a
report notes the submission of the dispute and records the failure of the parties to reach
agreement. If one party fails to appear or participate in the proceedings, a report notes
that that party‟s failure to appear or participate (Article 34 of the ICSID Convention).
Like the case of conciliation, the proceedings of arbitration are conducted
according to ICSID Convention, Regulations, and Rules and the ICSID Additional
Facility Rules. Arbitration is aimed to produce a binding determination of the dispute by
the Tribunal (37 of Executive Directors Report). Just like with conciliation, any
Contracting State or a national of a Contracting State wishing to institute arbitration
proceedings can send a written request to the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General
reviews the request to decide whether it is inside the jurisdiction of the Centre and
registers the request if the Centre is found to have jurisdiction (Article 28 of the ICSID
Convention). Five additional signed copies of the request need to be provided (Rule 4 of
the Institution Rules). The request should include information regarding the parties in
disputes, the date of consent, indication that the parties in dispute and the issues raised are
eligible for arbitration proceedings of the ICSID (Rule 2 of the Institution Rules). The
requesting party may withdraw the request before it is registered by sending a written
notice to the Secretary-General (Rule 8 of the Institution Rules).
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After the registration of the request, the Tribunal is to be constituted within 60
days. If the Tribunal is not constituted within 60 days successfully, the Tribunal is to be
constituted in accordance with the Article 37 of the ICSID Convention. If the Tribunal is
not constituted within 90 days, the Chairman of the Administrative Council is to make an
appointment or designation within 30 days after receiving a written request to do so by
the parties (Rule 4 of the Arbitration Rules). After the constitution of the Tribunal, it will
hold its first session within 60 days and the President of the Tribunal will be elected by its
members (Rule 13 of the Arbitration Rules). Deliberations of the Tribunal are exclusively
for the only members of the Tribunal (Rule 15 of the Arbitration Rules). Decisions of the
Tribunal are taken by a majority of the votes of all its members regarding, and abstention
is counted as a negative vote (Rule 16 of the Arbitration Rules). Time limits will be fixed
by the Tribunal or its President at the request of the Tribunal (Rule 26 of the Arbitration
Rules).
In addition to the request for arbitration, the written procedure consists of the
following pleadings. They are a memorial by the requesting party, a counter-memorial by
the other party, a reply by the requesting party, and a rejoinder by the other party. A
memorial should contain a statement of the relevant facts, a statement of law, and the
submissions. A counter-memorial, reply or rejoinder should contain an admission or
denial of the facts stated in the last previous pleading, and any additional facts, if
necessary (Rule 31 of the Arbitration Rules). After the completion of the presentation of
the case by the parties, the proceeding is declared closed (Rule 38 of the Arbitration
Rules). If there is a defaulting party that fails to appear or to present its case at any stage
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of the proceeding, the other party may request the Tribunal to deal with the questions
submitted to it and to render an award at any time before the discontinuance of the
proceeding (Rule 42 of the Arbitration Rules). When the parties agree on a settlement of
the dispute or otherwise to discontinue the proceeding and no award is rendered and the
Tribunal is not constituted, then the proceeding can be discontinued. Settlement is
considered complete when the parties file with the Secretary-General the full and signed
text of their settlement and send a written request to the Tribunal (Rule 43 of the
Arbitration Rules).
Within 120 days, the award should be drawn up and signed after closure of the
proceeding. If not, the Tribunal may extend this period by a further 60 days. The
members of the Tribunal who voted for it should sign the award and the date of each
signature should be indicated (Rule 47 of the Arbitration Rules).
The awards made by the Tribunal are binding and not subject to any other
remedies except they are explicitly expressed in the ICSID Convention. When the parties
give consent to the arbitration under the ICSID Convention, consent to such arbitration to
the exclusion of any other remedy is assumed. However, a Contracting State may require
the exhaustion of local administrative or judicial remedies as a condition of its consent to
arbitration under this Convention (Article 26 of the ICSID Convention)
The Secretary-general should promptly authenticate the original text of the award
and dispatch a certified copy of the award to each party upon signature by the last
arbitrator to sign. The award should be deemed to have been rendered on the date on
which the certified copies were dispatched, and the Centre should not publish the award
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without the consent of the parties (Rule 48 of the Arbitration Rules). Rules 50 through 55
of the Arbitration Rules address the issues regarding interpretation, revision, and
annulment of the award.
So far, the structure and the mechanisms of conciliation and arbitration in the
ICSID have been discussed. As stated above, the ICSID is one of subgroup of the World
Bank. And it was especially created to deal with the investment issues through
conciliation and arbitration. Since the late of 1990s, the number of the caseloads
registered under the ICSID has sharply increased. And the references to the ICSID have
also increased. These developments are evidence that the ICSID is playing a significant
role in the area of international investment settlement. It is important to keep autonomy
and independence as an international settlement institution. So its autonomy and
independence are examined by analyzing its cases. The cases of conciliation and
arbitration in the ICSID are available at the ICSID website and are divided into pending
and concluded cases respectively. The concluded arbitration cases are analyzed in this
thesis for the purpose of assessing the autonomy and independence of the ICSID.
Again, the main focus in this thesis is to evaluate the autonomy and independence
of the ICSID. With regard to these points, that is, autonomy and independence, I would
like to study two aspects of the ICSID: 1) analyzing the concluded arbitration cases of the
ICSID and 2) examining the structure of the ICSID.

II. Dispute Cases
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There are 325 cases listed on the ICSID website and 203 are concluded cases as of
September 30, 2010. Among 203 concluded cases, there are 197 concluded arbitration
cases and 6 concluded conciliation cases (See the ICSID website). In the list of concluded
cases, each case usually contains the names of the parties in dispute, subject matter, the
date of registration, the date of constitution of Tribunal or Commission, the outcome of
proceedings, and so forth.
Award is an official decision made by the Tribunal constituted in an arbitration
proceeding showing specifications of its proceedings including how the decision is
concluded and how fees and costs are paid. Since there is no award in conciliation
proceedings, only the 197 concluded arbitration cases are considered in this thesis.
However, according to Article 48 of the ICSID Convention, the Centre should not publish
an award without the consent of the parties involved. In case of that, it is difficult to see
how the decision is made since the award is not available.
There are also certain cases of proceedings between States and nationals of other
States that fall outside the scope of the ICSID Convention. In order for a requesting party
to be eligible for requesting an arbitration by the ICSID Convention, it should be a
Contracting State or a national of a Contracting State (Article 25 of the ICSID
Convention). Where one party is not a member, the Additional Facility Rules authorize
the Secretariat of the ICSID to administer those cases. For example, there are conciliation
or arbitration proceedings for the settlement of investment disputes between parties one
of which is not a Contracting State or a national of a Contracting State.
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On the ICSID website, the parties are usually specified as „an investment
company (Requesting Party) v. a contracting state (Respondent)‟, but the website does
not show the nationality of each company. However, an award shows the nationality of
the company. So I found the nationality of each company and recorded this data for the
available awards.
To evaluate autonomy and independence of the ICSID by analyzing the 197
concluded cases of the ICSID, I examine the composition of the Tribunal of each
concluded case to see if the nationalities of arbitrators would affect the outcomes of
arbitrations. However, an award does not show each arbitrator‟s decision. That is, it is not
specified that who voted for which party in dispute. It says usually „unanimously‟ or „by
a majority of‟ prior to describing specifications of the award. However, at least the
nationality of each arbitrator appears on the ICSID website. In most of the cases, the
Tribunal consists of three arbitrators. Occasionally there are also the cases with a sole
arbitrator.
The criterion which divides developed and developing countries are membership
in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
The 197 concluded arbitration cases are classified into three categories; 1) cases
with awards, 2) settled cases, and 3) discontinued cases. And the numbers of each case
are 123, 51, and 23 respectively. There are also cases that have not concluded with one
proceeding. For example, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1 went through five proceedings; 1)
Original Arbitration Proceeding, 2) Annulment Proceeding, 3) Resubmission, 4)
Supplementary Decision and Rectification Proceeding, and 5) Second Annulment
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Proceeding. For those cases, the last proceedings completed are coded as the dispute
outcome. Table 5 shows the overview of the concluded arbitration cases registered at the
ICSID.

Table 5. Overview of the Concluded Arbitration Cases Registered at the ICSID
Cases with Awards

Settled Cases

Discontinued Cases

TOTAL

123(62.4%)

51(25.9%)

23(11.7%)

197(100%)

Source: http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp

The number of the cases registered at the ICSID has increased during four
decades from 1970s to 2000s. It is notable that the first two decades did not include many
concluded cases whereas the later two decades have seen an increased number of
concluded cases registered at the ICSID. Table 6 shows the number of concluded
arbitration cases registered at the ICSID by decade.

Table 6. Number of Concluded Arbitration Cases Registered at the ICSID by Decade
Cases with Awards

Settled Cases

Discontinued Cases

TOTAL

1970s

4

4

1

9

1980s

6

9

0

15

1990s

29

5

7

41

55

Cases with Awards

Settled Cases

Discontinued Cases

TOTAL

2000s

84

33

15

132

Total

123

51

23

197

Source: http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp

Figure 4 shows the number of concluded arbitration cases registered at the ICSID
by decade. As seen in figure 4, the numbers of concluded arbitration cases registered at
the ICSID were not large during the first two decades. However, since 1990s, the number
of the cases began to increase sharply along with the number of the cases with awards
among them, and the recent two decades shows that the cases with awards are more
frequent than other categories of case outcome.

Figure 4. Number of Concluded Arbitration Cases registered at the ICSID by Decade

Source: http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp
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Those 123 concluded arbitration cases with awards include „decision of
annulment‟, „rectification of award‟, and „settlement in the form of award‟. After
evaluating all the cases registered on the ICSID website and published ones, I found that
86 awards in the concluded arbitration cases are available. Among the 86 cases, 3 cases
are the ones with settlement in the form of award. That is, the parties requested that the
settlements agreed by the parties be in the form of award. And the other 83 cases were
concluded in favor of either investor or state. In the thesis, the 83 cases are considered for
analysis because the 3 awards are, in fact, settlements in the form of award at the request
of the parties.
Figure 5 shows the winning rate for each party over time. As seen in figure 5,
until early 1990s, there were few cases registered at the ICSID. And it began to rise
sharply from later 1990s. Since 1991, the winning rate for the Respondents is far over
than 50%. From the fact, it can be expected that if there is an arbitration case, Respondent
would probably win the case with the winning rate over 50%.

Figure 5. Winning Rate for Each Party over Time

Source: http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp
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Figure 6 shows the winning rate for each issue over time. As seen in figure 6,
since later 1990s, the issue areas have become diversified more than before. Especially
after 2000s, industry and trade issues have become one of the major dispute issues. In
general, the winning rate for the respondents is higher than the requesting parties in the
overall issue areas. Regardless of issue areas, respondents have won more than requesting
parties in general.

Figure 6. Winning Rate for Each Issue over Time

Source: http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp

In brief, by analyzing the dispute cases, I found the following: 1) the cases
registered at the ICSID began to increase sharply and become diversified in terms of
issue areas; 2) The winning rate for the Respondents over time has been higher than for
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the Requesting Parties in general; and 3) In the overall issue areas, the Respondents have
won more cases than the Requesting Parties over time in general.

III. Autonomy and Independence
1. Autonomy and Independence in the ICSID Convention
The ICSID Administrative Council has overall autonomy in its competence. The
Council adopts the administrative and financial regulations of the centre, adopts the rules
of procedure for the institution of conciliation and arbitration proceedings, adopts the
rules of procedure for conciliation and arbitration proceedings, approves arrangements
with the Bank for the use of the Bank‟s administrative facilities and services, determines
the conditions of service of the Secretary-General and of any Deputy Secretary-General,
adopts the annual budget of revenues and expenditures of the Centre, and approves the
annual report on the operation of the Centre (Article 6 of the ICSID Convention).
When choosing the Panel of Conciliators and the Panel of Arbitrators, qualified
and willing persons are designated (Article 12 of the ICSID Convention, and the number
of the persons each Contracting State may designate is up to 4 persons to each Panel
(Article 13 of the ICSID Convention). And the persons who will serve on the Panels are
required to have high moral characters, recognized competence, and independent
judgment (Article 14 of the ICSID Convention).
Articles 18 through 24 in Section 6 specify the Status, Immunities and Privileges
of the ICSID. In terms of the status of the ICSID, it has a full international legal
personality. The capacity of the ICSID is to contract, to acquire and dispose of movable
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and immovable property, and to institute legal proceedings (Article 18 of the ICSID
Convention). The Chairman, the members of the Administrative Council, and conciliators
or arbitrators or members of a Committee are given immunity from legal process with
respect to acts performed by them in the exercise of their functions and the same
immunities from restrictions, requirements, and obligations as are given to the
representatives, officials, and employees of comparable rank of other Contracting States
(Article 21 of the ICSID Convention). The official communications of the ICSID will be
not be given less weight than that given to other international organizations (Article 23 of
the ICSID Convention). The tax and customs duty exemptions are given to the ICSID, its
assets, property and income, and its operations and transactions authorized by the ICSID
Convention (Article 24 of the ICSID Convention).
With respect to the jurisdiction of the ICSID, powerful autonomy and
independence are given under the ICSID Convention. Once the parties have given their
dispute consent to the ICSID, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally (Article 25
of the ICSID Convention) and the consent of the parties to arbitration under the ICSID
Convention is deemed consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy
unless otherwise stated (Article 26 of the ICSID Convention). Except for a Contracting
State‟s failure to abide by and comply with the award rendered in such dispute, no
Contracting State can give diplomatic protection, or bring an international claim to the
dispute (Article 27 of the ICSID Convention).
The ICSID also has provisions for the number of conciliators and the method of
their appointment. Unless the parties agree upon the number and the method separately,
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the Commission consists of three conciliators, one conciliator appointed by each party
and the third, who will be the president of the Commission, appointed by agreement of
the parties (Article 29 of the ICSID Convention) and the same rule applies to the
constitution of the Tribunal (Article 37 of the ICSID Convention). However, the majority
of the arbitrators should be nationals of States other than the Contracting State party to
the dispute and the Contracting State whose national is a party to the dispute unless
otherwise appointed by agreement of the parties (Article 39 of the ICSID Convention).
The Commission and the Tribunal will be the judge of their own competence
(Article 32 and 41 of the ICSID Convention). If it is necessary, the Tribunal may call
upon the parties to produce documents or other evidence, and visit the scene connected
with the dispute, and conduct such inquiries there if the Tribunal deems it appropriate
(Article 43 of the ICSID Convention). Unless otherwise agreed, the Tribunal determines
any incidental or additional claims or counterclaims as long as they are within the scope
of the consent of the parties and are otherwise within the jurisdiction of the Centre
(Article 46 of the ICSID Convention).
The award rendered by the Tribunal is binding on the parties and should not be
subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in the Convention
and each party should abide by and comply with the terms of the award except to the
extent that enforcement shall have been stayed pursuant to the relevant provisions of the
ICSID Convention (Article 53 of the ICSID Convention).
As stated above, the autonomy and independence of the ICSID, throughout its
Articles, are guaranteed to the extent that they apply into the following areas; 1) choosing
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the Panel of Conciliators and the Panel of Arbitrators, 2) Status, Immunities and
Privileges enjoyed by the ICSID, 3) its jurisdiction, 4) the provisions of the number of
conciliators and the method of their appointment, 5) competence of the Commission or
the Tribunal to the dispute under the ICSID Convention, and 6) the award rendered by the
Tribunal which is binding on the parties.
So far the structure, the Convention, and the concluded cases of the ICSID have
been examined in terms of its autonomy and independence. In the next section, the
concluded arbitration cases are analyzed in more detail to see if the autonomy and
independence of the ICSID are well maintained.

2. Autonomy and Independence in Practice
2-1. By OECD Membership
1) The Composition of Tribunals and Power Politics
By examining the composition of the Tribunals in the 83 cases, we will be able to
tell whether or not the selection of arbitrators in those Tribunals is influenced by power
politics. If Tribunals are mainly composed of arbitrators whose origins are developed
countries especially in the cases where the two parties are developed country and
developing country, this may imply lack of the objectivity of the ICSID.
To this end, the 83 cases are classified into four categories; 1) developed country
vs. developed country, 2) developed country vs. developing country, 3) developing
country vs. developed country, and 4) developing country vs. developing country. The
first country is a requesting party and the latter, a respondent. The criterion to divide
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developed or developing country is the membership of Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD).
The Tribunals of the 83 cases are also divided into four categories according to
OECD membership nationalities; 1) 3 from developed country and 0 from developing
country, 2) 2 from developed country and 1 from developing country, 3) 1 from
developed country and 2 from developing country, and 4) 0 from developed country and
3 from developing country. The composition of the Tribunal is specified as the ratio of
the number of arbitrators from developed country: to the number of arbitrators from
developing country. For example, if there is a Tribunal with two arbitrators from
developed country and one arbitrator from developing country, then it is specified as 2:1.
By the way there are also a few cases that do not fall in the four categories. They
are when there is a sole arbitrator or when one of the three arbitrators in a Tribunal has
dual citizenship. There are just five such cases in the 83 cases.
As shown above in table 4, there are more arbitrators from developing countries
than those from developed countries in the arbitration panel. However, the arbitrators
from developed countries have been selected more than those from developing countries
in the Compositions of the Tribunals. If such developed country-oriented Tribunals are
constituted more, winning outcomes may be in favor of developed countries.
Table 7 shows the parties and the compositions of the Tribunals in the 83 cases.
As seen in Table 7, developed country-oriented Tribunals are more numerous than
developing country-oriented Tribunals in each party category. The investors from
developed countries have brought more cases than the investors from developing
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countries. However, this may mean that the ICSID has been used mostly by developed
countries to promote their interests. There may be some reasons for this. First of all, most
of the investors are from multinational companies which are again mostly from
developed countries. Consequently it is relevant to think that the developed countryoriented Tribunals would affect the winning outcomes in the ICSID arbitrations. If so,
this could be a sign that the ICSID is impartial in its decision makings. The next section
addresses this matter.

Table 7. Parties and the Compositions of the Tribunals in the 83 Cases

The Compositions of
the Tribunals

The Parties

Total

Developed v.
Developed

Developed v.
Developing

Developing v.
Developed

Developing v.
Developing

3:0

16(88.89%)

26(44.83%)

2(66.67%)

2(50%)

2:1

2(11.11%)

21(36.21%)

1(33.33%)

1(25%)

1:2

0

5(8.62%)

0

0

0:3

0

1(1.72%)

0

1(25%)

ETC

0

5(8.62%)

0

0

18(100%)

58(100%)

3(100%)

4(100%)

Source: http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp

Table 8 shows the FDI flows by region, 2007-2009. As seen in table 8, more than
half of the FDI from 2007 through 2009 have been invested into developed countries. In
addition more than half of the FDI came from developed countries through the same
64

period. And more than half of the FDI in the world has flowed between developed
countries during the same period. Therefore it is not surprising that most of the requesting
parties are from developed countries.

Table 8. FDI Flows by Region, 2007-2009 (billions of dollars and percent)
Region
World

2007
2,100

FDI inflows
2008
2009
1,771
1,114

2007
2,268

FDI outflows
2008
2009
1,929
1,101

Developed economies

1,444

1,018

566

1,924

1,572

821

Developing economies

565

630

478

292

296

229

63

72

59

11

10

5

164

183

117

56

82

47

78

90

68

47

38

23

South, East and South-East Asia

259

282

233

178

166

153

South-East Europe and the CIS

91

123

70

52

61

51

Africa
Latin America and the Caribbean
West Asia

Memorandum: percentage share in world FDI flows
Developed economies

68.8

57.5

50.8

84.8

81.5

74.5

Developing economies

26.9

35.6

42.9

12.9

15.4

20.8

Africa

3.0

4.1

5.3

0.5

0.5

0.5

Latin America and the Caribbean

7.8

10.3

10.5

2.5

4.3

4.3

West Asia

3.7

5.1

6.1

2.1

2.0

2.1

South, East and South-East Asia

12.3

15.9

20.9

7.9

8.6

13.9

South-East Europe and the CIS

4.3

6.9

6.3

2.3

3.1

4.6

Source: World Investment Report, 2010

Second, the proceedings in the ICSID are expensive and require high levels of
competence and negotiating skills to win cases. For these reasons, developing countries
may give up bringing their cases to the ICSID or have no interest in disputing against
developed countries in the ICSID. Kim (2008) argues that although legalization decreases
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uncertainty and increases convergence of countries‟ expectations on international
outcomes, it also brings more financial burden that should be paid by the member
countries in the WTO by increasing the complexity and difficulty of procedures.
Consequently the countries with administrative capacity enjoy the benefits of increased
legalization more than the countries – usually developing countries - without such
capacity (Kim, 2008).

2) The Compositions of the Tribunals and the Winning Outcomes
By examining the relationship between the Compositions of the Tribunals and the
decisions of winning outcomes, we can tell whether the Compositions of the Tribunals
matter in the decisions by the ICSID.
Table 9 shows the winning outcomes between the parties in the 83 cases. As
shown in Table 9, when developed and developing countries are in dispute (61 cases),
developing countries won more cases (41 cases) than developed countries (20 cases).
Since developed countries have more finance and competence resources in general than
developing countries, it is reasonable to think that they would win more cases, but the
result does not support this line of thought.
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Table 9. Winning Outcome between the Parties in the 83 Cases
Winning Outcomes between the Parties in the 83 Cases
Developed vs.
Developed

Developed vs.
Developing

Developing vs.
Developed

Developing vs.
Developing

Developed

Developed

Developing

Developing

Developed

Developing

Developing

3:0

6

10

7

19

·

2

1

1

2:1

1

1

9

12

·

1

1

·

1:2

·

·

2

3

·

·

·

·

0:3

·

·

·

1

·

·

·

1

Etc

·

·

2

3

·

·

·

·

Subtotal

7

11

20

38

0

3

2

2

Tribunals

Developed

Total

18

58

3

4

Source: http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp

When considering the entire winning outcome among the parties of the 83 cases,
the respondents won the cases more than the requesting parties in general.
However, how do the compositions of the Tribunals affect the winning outcomes
of developed countries or respondents respectively? First, in order to see whether the
compositions of the Tribunals affect the winning outcome for the developed countries, I
chose 61 from the 83 cases. The parties of the 61 cases are from developed vs.
developing countries and from developing vs. developed countries. Accordingly the 22
cases from developed vs. developed countries and from developing vs. developing
countries are excluded from this analysis. Table 10 shows the correlation between the
compositions of the Tribunals and the developed countries who won the cases. However,
as seen in Table10, the correlation is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The
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results show that the compositions of the Tribunals do not affect the winning outcome for
the developed countries.

Table 10. Correlation between the Compositions of the Tribunals and the Developed
Countries who won the Cases
The Compositions of the Tribunals

Developed
Countries

Pearson Correlation

-.049

P-Value

.705

Second, in order to see whether the compositions of the Tribunals affect the
winning outcome for the Respondents, I analyzed the 83 cases again. Table 11 shows the
correlation between the compositions of the Tribunals and the Respondents who won the
cases. However, as seen in Table 11, the correlation is not statistically significant at the
0.05 level. The results show that the compositions of the Tribunals do not affect the
winning outcome for the Respondents.

Table 11. Correlation between the Compositions of the Tribunals and the Respondents
who won the Cases
The Compositions of the Tribunals
Pearson Correlation

-.014

P-Value

.900

Respondents
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From the facts stated above, I found the compositions of the Tribunals do not
affect the winning outcome for developed countries or Respondents respectively. In other
words the nationalities of the arbitrators in the ICSID do not affect decision making
procedures.

3) Duration of the Arbitration Proceedings
In relation with the autonomy and independence of the ICSID, it is also relevant
to see whether the durations of arbitration proceedings are similar. If the durations are
quite different in each party category, then it may be said that the ICSID is affected by
power politics. For example, when the duration of the arbitration proceeding between
developed (Requesting Party) v. developing country (Respondent) is quite shorter than
the duration between developing v. developed country, then it may be said that developed
countries affect the duration of the arbitration proceedings in the ICSID by using their
power and legal capacities.
First of all, as for the duration of the proceedings of the 197 cases, the average
durations for the three categories; 1) cases with awards, 2) settled cases, and 3)
discontinued cases are 1204, 1229, and 1121 days respectively. The duration periods
count from the date of case registration at the ICSID to the date of outcome of the last
proceedings. Table 12 shows the duration of the cases by the three kinds. As shown in
table 12, the average duration of the 197 cases is 1185 days. And the average duration of
the discontinued cases is 1121 days which is the shortest duration among the three kinds
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of cases. However, the difference between the average durations of the cases with awards
(123 cases) and the settled cases (51 cases) is just 25 days.

Table 12. Duration of the Cases by the Three Kinds
Cases with
Awards

Settled Cases

Discontinued
Cases

Total

The numbers of Cases

123

51

23

197

Days of Duration on
Average

1204

1229

1121

1185

Source: http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp

In order to see the dispersion for the durations of the 197 concluded arbitration
cases I figured out the standard deviations. Figure 7 shows the standard deviation for the
durations of the 197 cases. As seen in the figure 7, the maximum period and minimum
period of cases in this category are 4851 (Approx. 13yrs. 4mons.) and 102 (Approx.
3mons.) days respectively. The standard deviation is 689.95.

Figure 7. Standard Deviation for the Durations of the 197 Cases

Source: http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp
70

Table 13 shows the average durations of the 125 cases in which the nationalities
of the parties are available. 72 cases are excluded since the nationalities of the parties are
not available. As shown in Table 13, the average duration of cases between the developed
v. developing cases is the shortest among the four categories. The second shortest
category of cases is developed v. developed cases. The difference is by one day. The
third-shortest category of cases is that of developing v. developed countries. From the
results, it is assumed that the powerful legal capacities of developed countries may have
affected the duration of the cases. However, when developing countries as Requesting
Parties are in dispute with developed countries as Respondents, the average duration is
1,450 days which is longer than the average duration between developed v. developed or
developed v. developing country. Maybe the developed countries as Respondents
succeeded in defending their cases brought by developing countries making the duration
longer, but the average duration (2187 days) between even developing v. developing
cases is far longer than the average duration (1450 days) between developing v.
developed countries. Therefore the assumption is not strongly supported. Perhaps as
stated before, developing countries, in general, may have lacked legal capacities like
those which developed countries have and it might have affected the duration of the cases
in which developing countries have been involved by making the duration longer. For
example, perhaps the developing countries could not show enough evidence or were not
fully aware of arbitration proceedings resulting in delayed arbitration proceedings.
In order to know whether there is significant difference between the means
(average duration) of the two categories of developed v. developing countries and
71

developing v. developed countries, I performed t-test on it. When Equal variances are
assumed, Levene‟s Test for Equality of Variances shows that F (0.082) is not significant
(Sig.: 0.775). And when Equal variances are assumed, the value of Sig. (2-tailed) in t-test
for Equality of Means is 0.828 which is greater than 0.05. Therefore there is no
significant difference between the means of the two categories.
And in order to know whether there is significant difference between the means
(average duration) of the two categories of developed v. developed countries and
developing v. developed countries, I performed t-test on it. When Equal variances are
assumed, Levene‟s Test for Equality of Variances shows that F (0.042) is not significant
(Sig.: 0.839). And when Equal variances are assumed, the value of Sig. (2-tailed) in t-test
for Equality of Means is 0.811 which is greater than 0.05. Therefore there is no
significant difference between the means of the two categories.

Table 13. Average Durations of the 125 Cases by the Parties

Duration
by Day

Developed v.
Developed

Developed v.
Developing

Developing v.
Developed

Developing v.
Developing

1367(22)
Approx. 3 Yrs. 9
Mons.

1366(94)
Approx. 3 Yrs. 9
Mons.

1450(3)
Approx. 4 Yrs.

2187(6)
Approx. 6 Yrs.

Source: http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp

In order to see the dispersion, I figured out the standard deviation for the durations
of the 22 cases between developed v. developed countries. Figure 8 shows the standard
deviation for the durations of the 22 cases between developed v. developed countries. As
seen in figure 8 the maximum period and minimum period of this category is 2764
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(Approx. 7yrs. 6mons.) and 554 (Approx. 1yr. 6mons.) days respectively. The standard
deviation is 563.66.

Figure 8. Standard Deviation for the Durations of the 22 Cases between Developed v.
Developed Countries

Second, I figured out the standard deviation for the durations of the 94 cases
between developed v. developing countries. The figure 9 shows the standard deviation for
the durations of the 94 cases between developed v. developing countries. As seen in
figure 9, the maximum period and minimum period of this category is 4851(13yrs.
4mons.) and 419 (Approx. 1yr. 2mons.) days respectively. The standard deviation is
657.40.

73

Figure 9. Standard Deviation for the Durations of the 94 Cases between Developed v.
Developing Countries

Third, I figured out the standard deviation for the durations of the 6 cases between
developing v. developing countries. Figure 10 shows the standard deviation for the
durations of the 6 cases between developing v. developing countries. As seen in figure 10,
the maximum period and minimum period of this category is 4212 (Approx. 11yrs.
7mons.) and 1050 (Approx. 2yrs. 11mons.) days respectively. And the standard deviation
is 1140.19.
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Figure 10. Standard Deviation for the Durations of the 6 Cases between Developing v.
Developing Countries

For the durations of the cases between developing v. developed countries, the
figure for the standard deviation cannot be drawn due to the small number of the cases.
The maximum period and minimum period of this category is 2025 (Approx. 5yrs.
7mons.) and 1155 (Approx. 3yrs. 2mons.) days respectively. And the standard deviation
is 689.35.
In short, the durations among the four categories are specified in order from the
shortest days to the longest days; 1) 1366 days between developed v. developing
countries, 2) 1367 days between developed v. developed countries, 3) 1450 days between
developing v. developed countries, and 4) 2187 days between developing v. developing
countries. But why are the durations different? As stated before, it is difficult to say
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whether developed countries as Respondents in dispute cases defended their cases well
resulting in longer durations. Rather there may be some legal capacity deficiencies in
developing countries because the average duration between developing v. developing
countries is even longer than the average duration between developing v. developed
countries. The lack of legal capacity especially in developing countries may have
hindered developing countries from dealing with their cases in proper manner and timely
fashion which resulted in prolonged proceeding periods. As Kim (2004) and Busch et al.
(2003) point out the lack of legal capacities in developing countries, the legal capacities
especially in developing countries should be enhanced for equitable and fair decision
makings in the WTO (Kim, 2004 and Busch et al., 2003).

4) Compliance to ICSID Awards
In order to evaluate, especially, the autonomy of the ICSID, it is important to see
how well the Contracting States followed the ICSID decisions after the Tribunals gave
them awards. If the parties, especially the losing parties have followed the ICSID
decisions well, then the autonomy of the ICSID is respected by the Contracting States
compliance to ICSID awards which signals the autonomy of the ICSID as an international
institution1.
Baldwin et al. (2006) studied the enforcement of ICSID awards. According to the
authors of the article, there have been only three decisions challenging the enforcement

1

With regard to this matter, I sent an e-mail to the Secretariat of the ICSID and received a reply stating that
ICSID does not maintain data on enforcement of awards (Secretariat of the ICSID, 2010). However, I
found there were some scholars (Baldwin et al., 2006; Goodman, 2007; Reed at al., 2004) who studied this
matter.
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and execution of ICSID awards in national courts and one case challenging only
execution of the award as of 2006; two in France, one in the United States, and a recent
decision in England. All of the enforcement challenges have not been successful whereas
challenges to execution of the award against particular sovereign assets have been more
successful. These cases suggest that national courts have not fully accepted a deferential
role in the enforcement of ICSID awards. Interestingly the French lower courts
recognized national and international public policy as part of the framework within which
enforcement and execution decisions would be made leaving the possibility that judicial
enforcement of ICSID awards in France, the United States, or elsewhere may not be an
unchallengeable process (Baldwin, Kantor, and Nolan, 2006).
In addition there has been one prominent case with regard to this compliance
matter; Argentina. Argentina‟s situation poses a real problem for enforcement in the
future. An ICSID Tribunal ruled in favor of a U.S. company, CMS Gas Transmission
Company, against Argentina and ordered it to pay CMS over $130 million to compensate
for losses incurred as a result of a financial crisis in May 2005. But the Argentine
government could not follow its decision because the government defaulted on $80
billion of its debt in 2001. Furthermore some scholars criticized the ICSID as being more
unfavorable than justice systems in any other country in the world and argued that the
decision of a Tribunal cannot have higher legal significance than the domestic Argentine
Constitution. That is, any awards that conflict with domestic Argentine constitutional
legal rights may be rejected (Goodman, 2007). But expect for Argentina‟s cases, most of
the ICSID awards have been complied with by the Contracting States.
77

According to Reed at al. (2004), compliance to ICSID awards is robust because
the Contracting States presumably do not want to lose investors by blocking execution of
awards against them as such a move may lead to the negative reputational effects (Reed
at al., 2004). So reputational effects pressure the Contracting States to comply with
ICSID awards so that they could keep their investors within their states.
In relation with compliance to ICSID awards, there are also some points to ponder.
First, according the Article 53 of the ICSID Convention, the ICSID awards are binding
on the parties to the disputes which mean a losing party is required to comply with the
award and a winning party has the right to require compliance.
Second, again according to the Article 53 of the ICSID Convention, the ICSID
awards should not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided
for in the ICSID Convention. Those remedies are supplementation and rectification,
interpretation, revision, and annulment in the ICSID Convention.
Third, the finality of the ICSID awards is also one of its significant characters.
According to the Article 54 of the ICSID Convention, the ICSID awards should be
regarded as if the awards were final judgments of a court in the Contracting States.
In brief, so far there have been a few decisions challenging the enforcement of
ICSID awards. But they have not been successful though the previous challenges have
opened the possibility that there might be more challenges against ICSID awards. In
addition ICSID awards have exclusiveness over other forums on the same dispute and the
parties may not seek any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention, and
ICSID awards have finality in its characteristics and the parties should regard them like
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as final judgments in national courts. Therefore except the remedies expressed within the
ICSID Convention, it is not easy to overturn ICSID awards once they are decided to the
parties by the Tribunals.
So far four aspects of the ICSID have been discussed in order to see whether the
autonomy and independence of the ICSID are well respected; 1) The Composition of
Tribunals and Power Politics, 2) The Compositions of the Tribunals and the Winning
Outcomes, 3) Duration of the Arbitration Proceedings, and 4) Compliance to ICSID
Awards. The findings in each of these areas are briefly summarized. First, there have
been more developed-country arbitrators selected for the compositions of the Tribunals to
ICSID arbitrations although there are more developing-country arbitrators in the
arbitration panel. In terms of the compositions of the Tribunals, developed countries
prevail. Second, although there are more cases with the Tribunals consisting of more
developed-country arbitrators, the winning outcome shows that developing countries
have won more cases. And the compositions of the Tribunals do not affect the winning
outcomes. Third, the average durations of the arbitration proceedings in each party
category are different. The reason for this may be not because developed countries
defended their cases well, but because developing countries do not have enough legal
capacities delaying the proceeding durations. Finally, the Contracting States have
followed ICSID awards in most of the cases though there are a few cases which indicate
resistance to compliance to ICSID awards. Argentina‟s behavior following the case
dealing with a dispute arising out of the financial crisis in 2005 is the most prominent
case.
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2-2. By COW-defined Great Powers
1) The Composition of Tribunals and Power Politics
In this section, the Great Powers defined by Correlates of War are applied to
divide Great Power and Non-Great Power (COW, 2008). By examining the composition
of the Tribunals in the 83 cases, we will be able to tell whether or not the selection of
arbitrators in those Tribunals is influenced by power politics. If Tribunals are mainly
composed of arbitrators whose origins are from the Great Powers especially in the cases
where the two parties are Great Power and Non-Great Power, this may imply lack of the
objectivity of the ICSID.
To this end, the 83 cases are classified into four categories; 1) Great Power vs.
Great Power, 2) Great Power vs. Non-Great Power, 3) Non-Great Power vs. Great Power,
and 4) Non-Great Power vs. Non-Great Power. The first country is a requesting party and
the latter, a respondent.
The Tribunals of the 83 cases are also divided into four categories according to
COW-defined Great Powers; 1) 3 from Great Power and 0 from Non-Great Power, 2) 2
from Great Power and 1 from Non-Great Power, 3) 1 from Great Power and 2 from NonGreat Power, and 4) 0 from Great Power and 3 from Non-Great Power. The composition
of the Tribunal is specified as the ratio of the number of arbitrators from Great Power: to
the number of arbitrators from Non-Great Power. For example, if there is a Tribunal with
two arbitrators from Great Power and one arbitrator from Non-Great Power, then it is
specified as 2:1.
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By the way there are also a few cases that do not fall in the four categories. They
are when there is a sole arbitrator or when one of the three arbitrators in a Tribunal has
dual citizenship. There are just five such cases in the 83 cases.
Table 14 shows the parties and the compositions of the Tribunals in the 83 cases.
As seen in Table 14, there is no single case of Great Power v. Great Power. Non-Great
Power-oriented Tribunals are more numerous than Great Power-oriented Tribunals in
each party category. Consequently it is relevant to see whether the compositions of the
Tribunals would affect the winning outcomes in the ICSID arbitrations. If so, this could
be a sign that the ICSID is impartial in its decision makings. The next section addresses
this matter.

Table 14. Parties and the Compositions of the Tribunals in the 83 Cases

The Compositions of
the Tribunals

The Parties

Total

GP v. GP

GP v. Non-GP

Non-GP v. GP

Non-GP v. NonGP

3:0

.

1 (2.63%)

.

2 (4.76%)

2:1

.

10 (26.32%)

1 (33.33%)

12 (28.57%)

1:2

.

16 (42.11%)

2 (66.67%)

18 (42.86%)

0:3

.

10 (26.32%)

.

6 (14.29%)

ETC

.

1 (2.63%)

.

4 (9.52%)

.

38 (100%)

3 (100%)

42 (100%)

Source: http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp
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2) The Compositions of the Tribunals and the Winning Outcomes
By examining the relationship between the Compositions of the Tribunals and the
decisions of winning outcomes, we can tell whether the Compositions of the Tribunals
matter in the decisions by the ICSID. Table 15 shows the winning outcomes between the
parties in the 83 cases. As shown in Table 15, when Great Powers and Non-Great Powers
are in dispute (41 cases), Non-Great Powers won more cases (24 cases) than Great
Powers (17 cases). Since Great Powers have more finance and competence resources in
general than Non-Great Powers, it is reasonable to think that they would win more cases,
but the result does not support this line of thought.

Table 15. Winning Outcome between the Parties in the 83 Cases
Winning Outcomes between the Parties in the 83 Cases
GP v. GP

GP v. Non-GP

Non-GP v. GP

Non-GP v. Non-GP

GP

GP

Non-GP

Non-GP

GP

Non-GP

Non-GP

3:0

.

.

.

1

.

.

.

2

2:1

.

.

3

7

.

1

5

7

1:2

·

·

6

10

.

2

7

11

0:3

·

·

4

6

.

.

4

2

Etc

·

·

1

.

.

.

1

3

Subtotal

.

.

14

24

.

3

17

25

Tribunals

GP

Total

.

38

3

42

Source: http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp

When considering the entire winning outcome among the parties of the 83 cases,
the respondents won the cases more than the requesting parties in general.
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However, how do the compositions of the Tribunals affect the winning outcomes
or respondents respectively? First, in order to see whether the compositions of the
Tribunals affect the winning outcomes, I chose 41 from the 83 cases. The parties of the
41 cases are from Great Power vs. Non-Great Power and from Non-Great Power vs.
Great Power. Accordingly the 42 cases from Great Power vs. Great Power and from NonGreat Power vs. Non-Great Power are excluded from this analysis. Table 16 shows the
correlation between the compositions of the Tribunals and the Great Powers. However, as
seen in Table16, the correlation is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The results
show that the compositions of the Tribunals do not affect the winning outcome for the
Great Powers.

Table 16. Correlation between the Compositions of the Tribunals and the Great Powers
The Compositions of the Tribunals
Pearson Correlation

.142

P-Value

.375

Great Power

Second, in order to see whether the compositions of the Tribunals affect the
winning outcome for the Respondents, I analyzed the 83 cases again. Table 17 shows the
correlation between the compositions of the Tribunals and the Respondents. However, as
seen in Table 17, the correlation is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The
results show that the compositions of the Tribunals do not affect the winning outcome for
the Respondents.
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Table 17. Correlation between the Compositions of the Tribunals and the Respondents
The Compositions of the Tribunals
Pearson Correlation

-.138

P-Value

.213

Respondents

From the facts stated above, I found the compositions of the Tribunals do not
affect the winning outcome for Great Powers or Respondents respectively. In other words
the nationalities of the arbitrators in the ICSID do not affect decision making procedures.

3) Duration of the Arbitration Proceedings
The procedures are almost same like above except for using the COW-defined
Great Power. In relation with the autonomy and independence of the ICSID, it is also
relevant to see whether the durations of arbitration proceedings are similar. If the
durations are quite different in each party category, then it may be said that the ICSID is
affected by power politics. For example, when the duration of the arbitration proceeding
between Great Power (Requesting Party) v. Non-Great Power (Respondent) is quite
shorter than the duration between Non-Great Power v. Great Power, then it may be said
that Great Powers affect the duration of the arbitration proceedings in the ICSID by using
their power and legal capacities.
The duration periods count from the date of case registration at the ICSID to the
date of outcome of the last proceedings.
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Table 18 shows the average durations of the 125 cases in which the nationalities
of the parties are available. 72 cases are excluded since the nationalities of the parties are
not available. As shown in Table 18, there is no single case of Great Power v. Great
Power. And the average duration of cases between Non-Great Power v. Great Power is
the shortest among the three categories. The average duration of cases between NonGreat Power v. Non-Great Power is the second. And the average duration of cases
between Great Power v. Non-Great Power is the longest. The difference between the
shortest average duration and the longest duration is less than 100 days. That is, it seems
the status of the Great Power does not affect proceeding periods much.

Table 18. Average Durations of the 125 Cases by the Parties

Duration
by Day

GP v. GP

GP v. Non-GP

Non-GP v. GP

Non-GP v. Non GP

.

1434(64)
Approx. 3 Yrs. 11
Mons.

1350(3)
Approx. 3 Yrs 8
Mons.

1382(58)
Approx. 3 Yrs 9
Mons.

Source: http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp
In order to know whether there is significant difference between the means
(average duration) of the two categories of Great Power v. Non-Great Power and NonGreat Power v. Great Power, I performed t-test on it. When Equal variances are assumed,
Levene‟s Test for Equality of Variances shows that F (0.002) is not significant (Sig.:
0.967). And when Equal variances are assumed, the value of Sig. (2-tailed) in t-test for
Equality of Means is 0.847 which is greater than 0.05. Therefore there is no significant
difference between the means of the two categories.
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And in order to know whether there is significant difference between the means
(average duration) of the two categories of Great Power v. Non-Great Power and NonGreat Power v. Non-Great Power, I performed t-test on it. When Equal variances are
assumed, Levene‟s Test for Equality of Variances shows that F (0.436) is not significant
(Sig.: 0.510). And when Equal variances are assumed, the value of Sig. (2-tailed) in t-test
for Equality of Means is 0.675 which is greater than 0.05. Therefore there is no
significant difference between the means of the two categories.
And in order to know whether there is significant difference between the means
(average duration) of the two categories of Non-Great Power v. Great Power and NonGreat Power v. Non-Great Power, I performed t-test on it. When Equal variances are
assumed, Levene‟s Test for Equality of Variances shows that F (0.034) is not significant
(Sig.: 0.855). And when Equal variances are assumed, the value of Sig. (2-tailed) in t-test
for Equality of Means is 0.930 which is greater than 0.05. Therefore there is no
significant difference between the means of the two categories.
In order to see the dispersion, I figured out the standard deviation for the duration
of the 64 cases between Great Power v. Non-Great Power. Figure 11 shows the standard
deviation for the durations of the 64 cases between Great Power v. Non-Great Power. As
seen in figure 11, the maximum period and minimum period of this category is 4850
(Approx. 13yrs. 3mons.) and 419 (Approx. 1yr. 2mons.) days respectively. The standard
deviation is 743.53.
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Figure 11. Standard Deviation for the Durations of the 64 Cases between Great Power v.
Non-Great Power

Second, I figured out the standard deviation for the durations of the 58 cases
between Non-Great Power v. Non-Great Power. The figure 11 shows the standard
deviation for the durations of the 58 cases between Non-Great Power v. Non-Great Power.
As seen in figure 11, the maximum period and minimum period of this category is 4212
(11yrs. 7mons.) and 590 (Approx. 1yr. 7mons.) days respectively. The standard deviation
is 620.18.
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Figure 11. Standard Deviation for the Duration of the 58 Cases between Non-Great
Power v. Non-Great Power

For the cases for the durations between developing v. developed countries, the
figure for the standard deviation cannot be drawn due to the small number of the cases.
The maximum period and minimum period of this category is 2094 (Approx. 5yrs.
9mons.) and 854 (Approx. 2yrs. 4mons.) days respectively. And the standard deviation is
656.34.
In short, the durations among the four categories are specified in order from the
shortest days to the longest days; 1) 1350 days between Non-Great Power v. Great Power,
2) 1382 days between Non-Great Power v. Non-Great Power, and 3) 1434 days between
Great Power v. Non-Great Power. As stated before, it seems the status of the Great Power
does not affect proceeding periods much since the difference between the shortest
average duration and the longest duration is less than 100 days.
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When taking into account the findings stated above, the autonomy and
independence of the ICSID have been well maintained in general though there is also
some suggestive evidence that power politics have impacted the dispute settlement
mechanism of the ICSID. Moreover, as stated before, more cases are registered at the
ICSID and references to the ICSID have also increased over time. These facts also
contribute to its autonomy and independence.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
It is important for international institutions to keep their autonomy and
independence. However, can they work independently from great powers? From the
perspective of realism, international institutions are just tools with which great powers
wield their powers for their interests. Therefore they are not free from great powers. From
the perspective of institutional liberalism, international institutions can play important
roles for international cooperation among the nations and operate largely on their own
institutional strength rather than simply channeling the power of great states in the
international system in which they operate. Therefore they are autonomous in their
working sphere and independent from great powers, and influence states‟ behavior. In
order to answer the basic question of the thesis, I chose the ICSID to see if it possesses
autonomy and independence.
With the purpose of liberalizing trades in the world, the WTO was established in
January 1, 1995 replacing its predecessor, the GATT. The GATT and WTO represent
multilateralism. It means decision making requires the approval from all the member
countries. However, as the membership has increased, there have been lots of
disadvantages to multilateralism although it is said the WTO improved some problematic
situations arising from the GATT. First, as more countries join the WTO by gaining its
membership, the decision making process required an ever-increasing time period to
complete. There were 9 rounds under the GATT and WTO. Especially the last round
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called „Doha Round‟ has not yet concluded. And it is not clear when it will be concluded
even in the future. Second, the multilateral dispute settlement mechanism is also
laborious and the time period for reaching a settlement is also long. Third, there have
been anti-global protestors against multilateral trade under the WTO. With these reasons
in mind, states, especially developed countries have begun to put more attention on FTAs
which are faster, more transparent, as it is easier to handle issues bilaterally, and do not
require consent from countries outside the FTAs. Most of the FTAs include Bilateral
Investment Treaties and dispute settlement mechanisms. When disputes arise between the
parties in FTAs and they cannot reach an agreement bilaterally, then they may have
recourse to international arbitration institutions. The ICSID is one of the international
arbitration institutions specializing in dealing with international investment disputes
through conciliation and arbitration.
Its significance and usability have increased since the late 1990s when the number
of cases registered at the ICSID began to increase sharply. With the increase in the
number of FTAs, the number of the cases registered at the ICSID has also increased
making it more important internationally. It was established under the ICSID Convention
to provide facilities for the resolution of legal disputes between eligible parties through
conciliation or arbitration procedures. The ICSID Convention is the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States and was
entered into force on October 14, 1966.
As an international dispute settlement institution, autonomy and independence are
central to the effectiveness of the ICSID. So I considered its 197 concluded cases for
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analysis and the ICSID Convention to evaluate its autonomy and independence. From the
cases, I adopted the two criteria as coding measures: 1) developed country and
developing country by introducing OECD membership and 2) Great Power and NonGreat Power by introducing COW-defined Great Powers. By analyzing the IDSID data
available, I found that the influence of the great powers is evident in the compositions of
the Tribunals and in the number of requesting parties.
But when the Articles of the ICSID Convention are considered, the autonomy and
independence of the ICSID are guaranteed within the following areas; 1) choosing the
Panel of Conciliators and the Panel of Arbitrators, 2) Status, Immunities and Privileges
enjoyed by the ICSID, 3) its jurisdiction, 4) the provisions of the number of conciliators
and the method of their appointment, 5) competence of the Commission or the Tribunal
to the dispute under the ICSID Convention, and 6) the awards rendered by the Tribunal
which is binding on the parties.
In addition the data analysis shows that the compositions of the Tribunals do not
affect the winning outcomes in the arbitration cases. Although there are more arbitrators
from developed countries in the compositions of the Tribunals, the decisions are not
always made in favor of developed countries. The durations of the arbitration proceedings
vary in each party category. Probably it is because of the lack of legal capacities of
developing countries in the cases where OECD membership criterion is used. In the cases
where the COW definition is used, the difference of the durations between the three
categories is small (less than 100 days). As for the compliance by the Contracting States
to ICSID awards, most of decisions have been followed by member states, with a few
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notable exceptions, most prominently the recent case against Argentina. Considering all
these findings, the ICSID has kept its autonomy and independence to a certain degree in
general though there is also some evidence which may be seen as contradictory to this
conclusion. And reflecting the two perspectives, the overall findings in this thesis could
be supportive for institutional liberalism.
As for policy implications for the ICSID in the future, the expensive proceeding
fees and high negotiating skills needed to argue cases effectively may prevent developing
countries from bringing their cases to the ICSID. As Kim (2004) argues, developed
countries with administrative can leap the benefits of increased legalization more than
developing countries without such capacities during the transition from the GATT to the
WTO (Kim, 2004). If so, the ICSID, in accordance with the purpose of its establishment,
needs to provide those countries with easier access to the ICSID conciliation and
arbitration by improving its Convention, Rules and Regulations or lowering its
proceeding fees so that the ICSID can serve the Contracting Countries more fairly.
Compared to the duration of the proceedings in the WTO, the proceeding period
in the ICSID turned out longer than in the WTO after analyzing its durations of the cases
contrary to the hopes and expectations of the ICSID Convention drafters. Therefore the
proceeding period needs to be set up properly for serving the Contracting States better.
It should be also noted that developed countries do not win more frequently than
developing countries. Though the developing nations may take a longer time to argue
their cases due to financial and legal expertise restrictions, the outcomes of these cases
are not biased in favor of developed nations. As developing states gain experience by
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bringing cases to the ICSID, they will learn over time how to argue their cases more
effectively, and the duration of dispute arbitrations should decrease.
In this thesis, only the concluded cases registered at the ICSID are analyzed.
However, there are over 120 pending cases which have not yet concluded. As these cases
are concluded and added into the list of concluded cases, then there will be more data
available in future research on the ICSID. There are more international arbitration
institutions where dispute parties can bring their cases. So it would be worth studying
why the parties in dispute choose a certain institution for arbitration rather than others,
and how many and in what ways cases are dealt with in such institutions in relation with
the autonomy and independence of the institutions. In particular, it may be interesting to
see if developed states favor settling disputes within institutions which are more reliant
on great powers rather than settling disputes in relatively autonomous and independent
institutions
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Appendix 1. Summary of The Concluded Arbitration Cases of the ICSID
No.

Case No.

Requesting Party

Respondent

Date of
Registration

Date of
outcome of
Proceeding

1

ARB/72/1

Holiday Inns S.A. and others

Morocco

1/13/1972

10/17/1978

2

ARB/74/1

Adriano Gardella S.p.A.

Côte d'Ivoire

3/6/1974

8/29/1977

3

ARB/74/2

Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica, Inc.

Jamaica

6/21/1974

4

ARB/74/3

Kaiser Bauxite Company

Jamaica

5

ARB/74/4

Reynolds Jamaica Mines
Limited and Reynolds Metals
Company

6

ARB/76/1

Gabon

7

ARB/77/1

AGIP S.p.A.

8

ARB/77/2

S.A.R.L. Benvenuti & Bonfant

9

ARB/78/1

Guadalupe Gas Products
Corporation

10

ARB/81/1

11

ARB/81/2

Composition of Tribunal
President

Arbitrator I

Arbitrator II

Gunnar
LAGERGREN
(Swedish)
Pierre CAVIN
(Swiss)

Paul REUTER
(French)

J.C. SCHULTSZ
(Dutch)

Jacques Michel
GROSSEN (Swiss)

Dominique
PONCET (Swiss)

2/27/1977

Jørgen TROLLE
(Danish)

Michael KERR
(British)

Fuad ROUHANI
(Iranian)

6/21/1974

2/27/1977

Jørgen TROLLE
(Danish)

Michael KERR
(British)

Fuad ROUHANI
(Iranian)

Jamaica

6/21/1974

10/12/1977

Jørgen TROLLE
(Danish)

Michael KERR
(British)

Fuad ROUHANI
(Iranian)

Société
Serete S.A.

10/5/1976

2/27/1978

Pierre CAVIN
(Swiss)

Victor-Gaston
MARTINY
(Belgian)

Hans
SPITZNAGEL
(Swiss)

11/4/1977

11/30/1979

Jørgen TROLLE
(Danish)

René-Jean
DUPUY (French)

Fuad ROUHANI
(Iranian)

12/15/1977

8/8/1980

Jørgen TROLLE
(Danish)

Rudolf BYSTRICKY
(Czechoslovak)

Edilbert
RAZAFINDRALA
MBO (Malagasy)

Nigeria

3/20/1978

7/22/1980

Ivan WALLENBERG
(Swedish)

Amco Asia Corporation and
others

Republic of
Indonesia

2/27/1981

11/20/1984

Sompong
SUCHARITKUL
(Thai)

Klöckner Industrie-Anlagen
GmbH and others

United
Republic of
Cameroon
and Société
Camerounais
e des Engrais

4/14/1981

10/21/1983

Sompong
SUCHARITKUL
(Thai)

People's
Republic of
the Congo
People's
Republic of
the Congo
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Elihu
LAUTERPACHT
(British)
Arghyrios A.
FATOUROS
(Greek)

Andrea GIARDINA
(Italian)

Pieter SANDERS
(Dutch)
Dietrich
SCHINDLER
(Swiss)

Kéba MBAYE
(Senegalese)

No.

Case No.

Requesting Party

Respondent

Date of
Registration

Date of
outcome of
Proceeding

12

ARB/82/1

Société Ouest Africaine des
Bétons Industriels

Senegal

11/5/1982

13

ARB/83/1

Swiss Aluminium Limited and
Icelandic Aluminium Company
Limited

Iceland

6/16/1983

ARB/83/2

Liberian Eastern Timber
Corporation

Republic of
Liberia

15

ARB/84/1

Atlantic Triton Company
Limited

16

ARB/84/2

17

Composition of Tribunal
President

Arbitrator I

Arbitrator II

2/25/1988

Aron BROCHES
(Dutch)

Kéba MBAYE
(Senegalese)

J.C. SCHULTSZ
(Dutch)

3/6/1985

N/A

N/A

N/A

6/21/1983

3/31/1986

Bernardo M.
CREMADES
(Spanish)

Jorge
GONCALVES
PEREIRA
(Portuguese)

D.A. REDFERN
(British)

People's
Revolutionary
Republic of
Guinea

1/19/1984

4/21/1986

Pieter SANDERS
(Dutch)

Jean-François
PRAT (French)

Albert Jan VAN
DEN BERG
(Dutch)

Colt Industries Operating
Corporation

Republic of
Korea

2/21/1984

8/3/1990

Kenneth O.
RATTRAY
(Jamaican)

Ian E.
McPHERSON
(Canadian)

ARB/84/3

Southern Pacific Properties
(Middle East) Limited

Arab Republic
of Egypt

8/28/1984

5/20/1992

Claude REYMOND
(Swiss)

Eduardo JIMENEZ
DE ARECHAGA
(Uruguayan)
Arghyrios A.
FATOUROS
(Greek)

18

ARB/84/4

Maritime International
Nominees Establishment

Republic of
Guinea

9/18/1984

1/6/1988

Sompong
SUCHARITKUL
(Thai)

Aron BROCHES
(Dutch)

Kéba MBAYE
(Senegalese)

19

ARB/86/1

Ghaith R. Pharaon

Republic of
Tunisia

9/24/1986

11/21/1988

Claude REYMOND
(Swiss)

Giorgio BERNINI
(Italian)

20

ARB/87/1

Société d'Etudes de Travaux et
de Gestion SETIMEG S.A.

Republic of
Gabon

2/24/1987

1/21/1993

Claude REYMOND
(Swiss)

Henri CAILLAVET
(French)

21

ARB/87/2

Mobil Oil Corporation and
others

New Zealand

4/15/1987

11/26/1990

Graham SPEIGHT
(New Zealand)

Maureen BRUNT
(Australian)

22

ARB/87/3

Asian Agricultural Products
Limited

Democratic
Socialist

7/20/1987

6/27/1990

Ahmed Sadek ELKOSHERI

Samuel K.B.
ASANTE

14
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Kéba MBAYE
(Senegalese)

Karl-Heinz
BÖCKSTIEGEL
(German)
MarieMadeleine
MBORANTSUO
(Gabonese)
Stephen
CHARLES
(Australian)
Berthold
GOLDMAN

No.

Case No.

Requesting Party

Respondent

Date of
Registration

Date of
outcome of
Proceeding

Republic of
Sri Lanka

Composition of Tribunal
President

Arbitrator I

Arbitrator II

(Egyptian)

(Ghanaian)

(French)

23

ARB/87/4

Occidental of Pakistan, Inc.

Islamic
Republic of
Pakistan

10/7/1987

1/27/1989

Ian BROWNLIE
(British)

Anthony
COLMAN (British)

Ashraf Ullah
KHAN (British)

24

ARB/89/1

Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Company

Arab Republic
of Egypt

6/15/1989

6/24/1993

Ignaz SEIDLHOHENVELDERN
(Austrian)

Mohamed Yassin
ABDEL A'AL
(Sudanese)

Andreas
BUCHER (Swiss)

25

ARB/92/1

Vacuum Salt Products Ltd.

6/11/1992

2/16/1994

Robert Y.
JENNINGS (British)

Charles N.
BROWER (U.S.)

Kamal HOSSAIN
(Bangladeshi)

26

ARB/92/2

Scimitar Exploration Limited

11/3/1992

5/4/1994

Keith HIGHET
(U.S.)

Ian BROWNLIE
(British)

Edward C.
CHIASSON
(Canadian)

27

ARB/93/1

American Manufacturing &
Trading, Inc.

2/2/1993

2/21/1997

Sompong
SUCHARITKUL
(Thai)

28

ARB/94/1

Philippe Gruslin

Malaysia

1/13/1994

4/24/1996

N/A

29

ARB/94/2

Tradex Hellas S.A.

Republic of
Albania

12/8/1994

4/29/1999

Fred F. FIELDING
(U.S.)

Daoud L.
KHAIRALLAH
(Lebanese)
Sompong
SUCHARITKUL
(Thai)
Karl-Heinz
BÖCKSTIEGEL
(German)

30

ARB/95/1

Leaf Tobacco A. Michaelides
S.A. and Greek-Albanian Leaf
Tobacco & Co. S.A.

Republic of
Albania

4/27/1995

1/30/1997

N/A

N/A

N/A

31

ARB/95/2

Cable Television of Nevis, Ltd.
and Cable Television of Nevis
Holdings, Ltd.

Federation of
St. Kitts and
Nevis

11/14/1995

1/13/1997

Woodbine A.
DAVIS (Barbadian)

Arthur A.
MAYNARD
(Barbadian)

Rex McKAY
(Guyanese)

32

ARB/95/3

Antoine Goetz and others

Republic of
Burundi

12/18/1995

2/10/1999

Prosper WEIL
(French)

Mohammed
BEDJAOUI

Jean-Denis
BREDIN (French)

Republic of
Ghana
Bangladesh
and
Bangladesh
Oil, Gas and
Mineral
Corporation
Democratic
Republic of
the Congo
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Kéba MBAYE
(Senegalese)
N/A
Andrea
GIARDINA
(Italian)

No.

Case No.

Requesting Party

Respondent

Date of
Registration

Date of
outcome of
Proceeding

Composition of Tribunal
President

Arbitrator I

Arbitrator II

(Algerian)

33

ARB/96/1

Compañia del Desarrollo de
Santa Elena S.A.

Republic of
Costa Rica
Independent
State of
Papua New
Guinea
Republic of
Venezuela
United
Mexican
States

12/18/1995

6/8/2000

L. Yves FORTIER
(Canadian)

Elihu
LAUTERPACHT
(British)

Prosper WEIL
(French)

4/29/1996

5/14/2001

N/A

Gavan GRIFFITH
(Australian)

N/A

6/26/1996

3/9/1998

1/13/1997

8/30/2000

34

ARB/96/2

Misima Mines Pty. Ltd.

35

ARB/96/3

Fedax N.V.

36

ARB(AF)/97/1

Metalclad Corporation

37

ARB/97/1

Société d'Investigation de
Recherche et d'Exploitation
Minière

Burkina Faso

1/27/1997

1/19/2000

Arghyrios A.
FATOUROS (Greek)

Séna
AGBAYISSAH
(Togolese)

Pierre TERCIER
(Swiss)

38

ARB/97/2

Société Kufpec (Congo) Limited

Republic of
Congo

1/27/1997

9/8/1997

N/A

N/A

N/A

39

ARB/97/3

Compañía de Aguas del
Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi
Universal S.A.

Argentine
Republic

2/19/1997

8/10/2010

Ahmed Sadek ELKOSHERI
(Egyptian)

Andreas J.
JACOVIDES
(Cypriot)

40

ARB(AF)/97/2

Robert Azinian and others

United
Mexican
States

3/24/1997

11/1/1999

Jan PAULSSON
(French)

Benjamin R.
CIVILETTI (U.S.)

Jan Hendrik
DALHUISEN
(Dutch)
Claus von
WOBESER
(Mexican)

41

ARB/97/4

Československa obchodní
banka, a.s.

Slovak
Republic

4/25/1997

12/29/2004

Hans VAN HOUTTE
(Belgian)

Piero
BERNARDINI
(Italian)

Andreas
BUCHER (Swiss)

42

ARB/97/5

WRB Enterprises and Grenada
Private Power Limited

Grenada

7/30/1997

12/21/1998

John MURRAY
(British)

Pierre LALIVE
(Swiss)

Nicholas
LIVERPOOL
(Dominica)

Lanco International, Inc.

Argentine
Republic

10/17/2000

Bernardo M.
CREMADES
(Spanish)

Guillermo
AGUILAR
ALVAREZ
(Mexican)

Luiz OLAVO
BAPTISTA
(Brazilian)

43

ARB/97/6

10/14/1997
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Francisco ORREGO
VICUÑA (Chilean)
Elihu
LAUTERPACHT
(British)

Meir HETH
(Israeli)
Benjamin R.
CIVILETTI (U.S.)

Roberts B.
OWEN (U.S.)
José Luis
SIQUEIROS
(Mexican)

No.

Case No.

Requesting Party

Respondent

Date of
Registration

Date of
outcome of
Proceeding

44

ARB/97/7

Emilio Agustín Maffezini

Kingdom of
Spain

10/30/1997

1/31/2001

Francisco ORREGO
VICUÑA (Chilean)

45

ARB/97/8

Compagnie Française pour le
Développement des Fibres
Textiles

Côte d'Ivoire

11/4/1997

4/4/2000

Pierre DRAI
(French)

46

ARB(AF)/98/1

Joseph C. Lemire

Ukraine

1/16/1998

9/18/2000

Elihu
LAUTERPACHT
(British)

Jan PAULSSON
(French)

Jürgen VOSS
(German)

47

ARB/98/1

Houston Industries Energy, Inc.
and others

Argentine
Republic

2/25/1998

8/24/2001

Piero BERNARDINI
(Italian)

Santiago TORRES
BERNÁRDEZ
(Spanish)

48

ARB/98/3

International Trust Company of
Liberia

Republic of
Liberia

5/28/1998

7/24/2002

Albert Jan VAN
DEN BERG (Dutch)

Ian S. FORRESTER
(British)

Albert Jan VAN
DEN BERG
(Dutch)
Maureen
PONSONBY
(British)

7/31/1998

12/8/2000

Klaus M. SACHS
(German)

Composition of Tribunal
President

Arbitrator I
Thomas
BUERGENTHAL
(U.S.
Matthieu DE
BOISSÉSON
(French)

49

ARB/98/4

Wena Hotels Limited

Arab Republic
of Egypt

50

ARB/98/5

Eudoro A. Olguín(Dual
Citizenship: Peru & USA)

Republic of
Paraguay

8/26/1998

7/26/2001

Rodrigo
OREAMUNO
(Costa Rican)

51

ARB/98/6

Compagnie Minière
Internationale Or S.A.

Republic of
Peru

10/28/1998

2/23/2001

Ian BROWNLIE
(British)

Ibrahim
FADLALLAH
(Lebanese/Frenc
h)
Eduardo
MAYORA
ALVARADO
(Guatemalan)
Henri C. ÁLVAREZ
(Canadian)

52

ARB/98/7

Banro American Resources,
Inc. and Société Aurifère du
Kivu et du Maniema S.A.R.L.

10/28/1998

9/1/2000

Prosper WEIL
(French)

Alioune DIAGNE
(Senegalese)

53

ARB(AF)/98/2

Waste Management, Inc.

Democratic
Republic of
the Congo
United
Mexican
States

11/18/1998

6/2/2000

Bernardo M.
CREMADES
(Spanish)

Keith HIGHET
(U.S.)

54

ARB(AF)/98/3

The Loewen Group, Inc. and
Raymond L. Loewen

11/19/1998

9/13/2004

Anthony MASON
(Australian)

Abner J. MIKVA
(U.S.)

United States
of America
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Arbitrator II
)Maurice WOLF
(U.S.)
Marcel STORME
(Belgian)

Carl F. SALANS
(U.S.)

Francisco REZEK
(Brazilian)
Keith HIGHET
(U.S.)
Carveth
Harcourt GEACH
(South African)
Eduardo T.
SIQUEIROS
(Mexican)
Michael
MUSTILL
(British)

No.

Case No.

Requesting Party

55

ARB/98/8

Tanzania Electric Supply
Company Limited

56

ARB/99/1

Mobil Argentina S.A.

57

ARB/99/2

Alex Genin and others

58

ARB/99/3

59

Respondent

Date of
Registration

Date of
outcome of
Proceeding

12/7/1998

Composition of Tribunal
President

Arbitrator I

Arbitrator II

8/19/2010

Kenneth S.
ROKISON (British)

Makhdoom ALI
KHAN (Pakistani)

Andrew ROGERS
(Australian)

4/9/1999

7/21/1999

N/A

N/A

N/A

Republic of
Estonia

5/12/1999

4/4/2002

L. Yves FORTIER
(Canadian)

Meir HETH
(Israeli)

Philippe Gruslin

Malaysia

5/12/1999

4/2/2002

ARB(AF)/99/1

Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa

United
Mexican
States

5/27/1999

6/13/2003

60

ARB/99/4

Empresa Nacional de
Electricidad S.A.

Argentine
Republic

7/12/1999

2/8/2001

61

ARB/99/5

Alimenta S.A.

Republic of
The Gambia

7/12/1999

5/3/2001

Charles N.
BROWER (U.S.)

62

ARB(AF)/99/2

Mondev International Ltd.

United States
of America

9/20/1999

10/11/2002

Ninian STEPHEN
(Australian)

63

ARB/99/6

Middle East Cement Shipping
and Handling Co. S.A.

Arab Republic
of Egypt

11/19/1999

4/12/2002

64

ARB/99/7

Patrick Mitchell

Democratic
Republic of
the Congo

12/10/1999

11/1/2006

65

ARB/99/8

Astaldi S.p.A. & Columbus
Latinoamericana de
Construcciones S.A.

Republic of
Honduras

12/29/1999

10/19/2000

Independent
Power
Tanzania
Limited
Argentine
Republic
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Thomas
BUERGENTHAL
(U.S.)
Konstantinos D.
KERAMEUS
(Greek)
Rodrigo
OREAMUNO
(Costa Rican)

Kamal HOSSAIN
(Bangladeshi)
Jorge
COVARRUBIAS
BRAVO (Mexican)
Enrique ELÍAS
(Peruvian)

Karl-Heinz
BÖCKSTIEGEL
(German)
Antonias C.
DIMOLITSA
(Greek)

Samuel K.B.
ASANTE
(Ghanaian)
James R.
CRAWFORD
(Australian)
Piero
BERNARDINI
(Italian)
Robert S.M.
DOSSOU
(Beninese)

Roberto ANDINO
(Honduran)

German FLORES
(Honduran)

Albert Jan VAN
DEN BERG
(Dutch)
Gabrielle
KAUFMANNKOHLER (Swiss)
David A. GANTZ
(U.S.)
Héctor GROS
ESPIELL
(Uruguayan)
Kenneth S.
ROKISON
(British)
Stephen M.
SCHWEBEL
(U.S.)
Don WALLACE,
Jr. (U.S.)
Andrea
GIARDINA
(Italian)
Carlos Roberto
CASTILLO
(Honduran)

No.

Case No.

Requesting Party

Respondent

Date of
Registration

Date of
outcome of
Proceeding

66

ARB/00/1

Zhinvali Development Ltd.

Republic of
Georgia

1/7/2000

67

ARB/00/2

Mihaly International
Corporation

68

ARB/00/3

GRAD Associates, P.A.

69

ARB/00/4

Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and
Italstrade S.p.A.

Kingdom of
Morocco

70

ARB/00/5

Autopista Concesionada de
Venezuela, C.A.

71

ARB/00/6

72

ARB/00/7

Composition of Tribunal
President

Arbitrator I

Arbitrator II

1/24/2003

Davis R.
ROBINSON (U.S.)

Andreas J.
JACOVIDES
(Cypriot)

Seymour J.
RUBIN (U.S.)

1/11/2000

3/15/2002

Sompong
SUCHARITKUL
(Thai)

Andrew ROGERS
(Australian)

David
SURATGAR
(British)

3/1/2000

2/5/2002

Francisco ORREGO
VICUÑA (Chilean)

Andreas J.
JACOVIDES
(Cypriot)

Francisco REZEK
(Brazilian)

6/13/2000

2/4/2004

Robert BRINER
(Swiss)

Bernardo M.
CREMADES
(Spanish)

Bolivarian
Republic of
Venezuela

6/23/2000

9/23/2003

Consortium R.F.C.C.

Kingdom of
Morocco

6/28/2000

1/18/2006

World Duty Free Company
Limited

Republic of
Kenya

7/7/2000

10/4/2006

7/27/2000

8/30/2004

Democratic
Socialist
Republic of
Sri Lanka
Bolivarian
Republic of
Venezuela

73

ARB/00/8

Ridgepointe Overseas
Developments, Ltd.

Democratic
Republic of
the Congo
and Générale
des Carrières
et des Mines

74

ARB(AF)/00/1

ADF Group Inc.

United States
of America

8/25/2000

1/9/2003

75

ARB(AF)/00/2

Técnicas Medioambientales
Tecmed, S.A.

United
Mexican
States

8/28/2000

5/29/2003
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Karl-Heinz
BÖCKSTIEGEL
(German)
Arghyrios A.
FATOUROS
(Greek)

Ibrahim
FADLALLAH
(Lebanese/Frenc
h)
Bernardo M.
CREMADES
(Spanish)
Franklin
BERMAN
(British)

V.V. VEEDER
(British)

Andrew ROGERS
(Australian)

Raúl E. VINUESA
(Argentine)

Andreas F.
LOWENFELD
(U.S.)

Brigitte STERN
(French)

Florentino P.
FELICIANO
(Philippine)
Horacio A.
GRIGERA NAÓN
(Argentine)

Armand DE
MESTRAL
(Canadian)
José Carlos
FERNÁNDEZ
ROZAS (Spanish)

Gabrielle
KAUFMANNKOHLER (Swiss)
Bernard
HANOTIAU
(Belgian)
Gilbert
GUILLAUME
(French)

Carolyn B.
LAMM (U.S.)
Carlos BERNAL
VEREA
(Mexican)

No.

Case No.

Date of
Registration

Date of
outcome of
Proceeding

Composition of Tribunal

Requesting Party

Respondent

9/27/2000

4/30/2004

James R.
CRAWFORD
(Australian)

President

Arbitrator I

Arbitrator II

76

ARB(AF)/00/3

Waste Management, Inc.

United
Mexican
States

77

ARB/00/9

Generation Ukraine Inc.

Ukraine

10/20/2000

9/16/2003

Jan PAULSSON
(French)

Eduardo
MAGALLÓN
GÓMEZ
(Mexican)
Eugen SALPIUS
(Austrian)

78

ARB/01/1

United Arab
Emirates

2/15/2001

8/7/2001

N/A

N/A

N/A

79

ARB/01/3

Impregilo, S.p.A and Rizzani De
Eccher S.p.A.
Enron Creditors Recovery
Corporation (formerly Enron
Corporation) and Ponderosa
Assets, L.P.

Argentine
Republic

4/11/2001

7/30/2010

Gavan GRIFFITH
(Australian)

Patrick L.
ROBINSON
(Jamaican)

Per TRESSELT
(Norwegian)

80

ARB/01/4

AES Summit Generation
Limited

Republic of
Hungary

4/25/2001

1/3/2002

Allan PHILIP
(Danish)

Francisco
ORREGO VICUÑA
(Chilean)

Prosper WEIL
(French)

81

ARB/01/5

Société d'Exploitation des
Mines d'Or de Sadiola S.A.

Republic of
Mali

5/24/2001

2/25/2003

Bernardo M.
CREMADES
(Spanish)

Robert S.M.
DOSSOU
(Beninese)

Ibrahim
FADLALLAH
(Lebanese/Frenc
h)

82

ARB/01/6

AIG Capital Partners, Inc. and
CJSC Tema Real Estate
Company

Republic of
Kazakhstan

6/4/2001

10/7/2003

Fali S. NARIMAN
(Indian)

83

ARB/01/7

MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD
Chile S.A.

Republic of
Chile

8/6/2001

3/21/2007

84

ARB/01/8

CMS Gas Transmission
Company

Argentine
Republic

8/24/2001

9/25/2007

85

ARB/01/9

Booker plc

9/18/2001

10/11/2003

N/A

Brigitte STERN
(French)

N/A

86

ARB/01/10

Repsol YPF Ecuador S.A.

10/5/2001

1/8/2007

Judd L. KESSLER
(U.S.)

Piero
BERNARDINI
(Italian)

Gonzalo BIGGS
(Chilean)

Co-operative
Republic of
Guyana
Empresa
Estatal
Petróleos del

119

Gilbert
GUILLAUME
(French)
Gilbert
GUILLAUME
(French)

Piero
BERNARDINI
(Italian)
James R.
CRAWFORD
(Australian)
Nabil ELARABY
(Egyptian)

Benjamin R.
CIVILETTI (U.S.)
Jürgen VOSS
(German)

Branko VUKMIR
(Croatian)
Sara ORDOÑEZ
NORIEGA
(Colombian)
James R.
CRAWFORD
(Australian)

No.

Case No.

Requesting Party

Respondent

Date of
Registration

Date of
outcome of
Proceeding

10/17/2001

10/12/2005

10/23/2001

9/1/2009

11/21/2001

5/23/2004

11/29/2001

3/3/2006

Fali S. NARIMAN
(Indian)

Franklin BERMAN
(British)

Composition of Tribunal
President

Arbitrator I

Arbitrator II

Jeremy LEVER
(British)

Pierre-Marie
DUPUY (French)

Bola AJIBOLA
(Nigerian)

Michael HWANG
(Singaporean)
J. Christopher
THOMAS
(Canadian)
Michael
MUSTILL
(British)
Alberto
Guillermo
SAAVEDRA
OLAVARRIETA
(Mexican)

Ecuador
(Petroecuado
r)
Romania

Karl-Heinz
BÖCKSTIEGEL
(German)
Gavan GRIFFITH
(Australian)
Florentino P.
FELICIANO
(Philippine)

87

ARB/01/11

Noble Ventures, Inc.

88

ARB/01/12

Azurix Corp.

89

ARB/01/13

SGS Société Générale de
Surveillance S.A.

90

ARB/01/14

F-W Oil Interests, Inc.

91

ARB(AF)/02/1

Fireman's Fund Insurance
Company

United
Mexican
States

1/15/2002

7/17/2006

Albert Jan VAN
DEN BERG (Dutch)

Andreas F.
LOWENFELD
(U.S.)

92

ARB/02/2

Impregilo S.p.A.

Islamic
Republic of
Pakistan

2/12/2002

6/11/2002

N/A

N/A

N/A

2/25/2002

3/28/2006

David D. CARON
(U.S.)

Henri C. ÁLVAREZ
(Canadian)

José Luis
ALBERROSEMERENA
(Mexican)
N/A

Argentine
Republic
Islamic
Republic of
Pakistan
Republic of
Trinidad &
Tobago

André J.E.
FAURÈS (Belgian)

93

ARB/02/3

Aguas del Tunari S.A.

Republic of
Bolivia

94

ARB/02/4

Lafarge

Republic of
Cameroon

4/22/2002

6/13/2003

N/A

N/A

95

ARB/02/5

PSEG Global Inc. and Konya
Ilgin Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret
Limited Sirketi

Republic of
Turkey

5/2/2002

1/19/2007

Francisco ORREGO
VICUÑA (Chilean)

L. Yves FORTIER
(Canadian)

96

ARB/02/6

SGS Société Générale de
Surveillance S.A.

Republic of
the
Philippines

6/6/2002

4/11/2008

Ahmed Sadek ELKOSHERI
(Egyptian)

Antonio
CRIVELLARO
(Italian)

120

Gabrielle
KAUFMANNKOHLER (Swiss)
James R.
CRAWFORD
(Australian)

No.

Case No.

Requesting Party

Respondent

Date of
Registration

Date of
outcome of
Proceeding

97

ARB/02/7

Hussein Nuaman Soufraki

United Arab
Emirates

6/18/2002

98

ARB/02/8

Siemens A.G.

Argentine
Republic

99

ARB/02/9

Champion Trading Company
and Ameritrade International,
Inc.

100

ARB/02/10

101

Composition of Tribunal
President

Arbitrator I

Arbitrator II

6/5/2007

Florentino P.
FELICIANO
(Philippine)

Omar NABULSI
(Jordanian)

Brigitte STERN
(French)

7/17/2002

9/9/2009

Andrés RIGO
SUREDA (Spanish)

Charles N.
BROWER (U.S.)

Domingo BELLO
JANEIRO
(Spanish)

Arab Republic
of Egypt

8/8/2002

10/27/2006

Robert BRINER
(Swiss)

L. Yves FORTIER
(Canadian)

Laurent AYNÈS
(French)

IBM World Trade Corp.

Republic of
Ecuador

9/6/2002

7/22/2004

Rodrigo JIJÓN
LETORT
(Ecuadorian)

ARB/02/11

Enrho St Limited

Republic of
Kazakhstan

9/6/2002

11/8/2004

Jan PAULSSON
(French)

102

ARB/02/12

JacobsGibb Limited

9/17/2002

10/13/2004

León ROLDÓS
AGUILERA
(Ecuadorian)
Albert Jan VAN
DEN BERG
(Dutch)
James R.
CRAWFORD
(Australian)

103

ARB/02/13

Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and
Italstrade S.p.A.

11/7/2002

1/31/2006

Karl-Heinz
BÖCKSTIEGEL
(German)
Gilbert
GUILLAUME
(French)

Alejandro PONCE
MARTÍNEZ
(Ecuadorian)
Ahmed Sadek ELKOSHERI
(Egyptian)
Giorgio
SACERDOTI
(Italian)
Bernardo M.
CREMADES
(Spanish)

104

ARB/02/14

CDC Group plc

Republic of
Seychelles

11/7/2002

6/29/2005

Charles N.
BROWER (U.S.)

Michael HWANG
(Singaporean)

105

ARB/02/16

Sempra Energy International

Argentine
Republic

12/6/2002

6/29/2010

Christer
SÖDERLUND
(Swedish)

David A.O.
EDWARD (British)

106

ARB/02/18

Tokios Tokelės

Ukraine

12/20/2002

7/26/2007

Michael MUSTILL
(British)

Daniel M. PRICE
(U.S.)

107

ARB/03/1

Ed. Züblin AG

1/28/2003

7/22/2003

N/A

N/A

N/A

108

ARB/03/3

Impregilo S.p.A.

3/3/2003

9/26/2005

Gilbert
GUILLAUME
(French)

Bernardo M.
CREMADES
(Spanish)

Toby LANDAU
(British)

Hashemite
Kingdom of
Jordan
Hashemite
Kingdom of
Jordan

Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia
Islamic
Republic of
Pakistan

121

Ian SINCLAIR
(British)
David A.R.
WILLIAMS (New
Zealand)
Andreas J.
JACOVIDES
(Cypriot)
Piero
BERNARDINI
(Italian)

Case No.

Requesting Party

Respondent

Date of
Registration

Date of
outcome of
Proceeding

109

ARB/03/4

Industria Nacional de
Alimentos, S.A. and Indalsa
Perú, S.A. (formerly Empresas
Lucchetti, S.A. and Lucchetti
Perú, S.A.)

Republic of
Peru

3/26/2003

110

ARB/03/5

Metalpar S.A. and Buen Aire
S.A.

Argentine
Republic

111

ARB/03/6

M.C.I. Power Group, L.C. and
New Turbine, Inc.

112

ARB/03/7

113

114

No.

Composition of Tribunal
President

Arbitrator I

Arbitrator II

11/30/2007

Hans DANELIUS
(Swedish)

Andrea GIARDINA
(Italian)

Franklin
BERMAN
(British)

4/7/2003

6/6/2008

Rodrigo
OREAMUNO
(Costa Rican)

Duncan H.
CAMERON (U.S.)

Jean Paul
CHABANEIX
(Peruvian)

Republic of
Ecuador

4/8/2003

10/19/2009

Camuzzi International S.A.

Argentine
Republic

4/23/2003

1/25/2007

ARB/03/8

Consortium Groupement
L.E.S.I. - DIPENTA

People's
Democratic
Republic of
Algeria

5/20/2003

1/10/2005

Pierre TERCIER
(Swiss)

André J.E.
FAURÈS (Belgian)

Emmanuel
GAILLARD
(French)

ARB/03/11

Joy Mining Machinery Limited

Arab Republic
of Egypt

6/2/2003

12/16/2005

Antonias C.
DIMOLITSA
(Greek)

Michael HWANG
(Singaporean)

José Luis SHAW
(Uruguayan)

Argentine
Republic

6/5/2003

6/23/2005

Lucius CAFLISCH
(Swiss)

Piero
BERNARDINI
(Italian)

Brigitte STERN
(French)

Argentine
Republic

6/6/2003

8/20/2008

Lucius CAFLISCH
(Swiss)

Albert Jan VAN
DEN BERG
(Dutch)

Brigitte STERN
(French)

Pioneer Natural Resources
Company, Pioneer Natural
Resources (Argentina) S.A. and
Pioneer Natural Resources
(Tierra del Fuego) S.A.
Pan American Energy LLC and
BP Argentina Exploration
Company

Dominique
HASCHER (French)
Enrique GÓMEZPINZÓN
(Colombian)

Hans DANELIUS
(Swedish)
Henri C. ÁLVAREZ
(Canadian)

115

ARB/03/12

116

ARB/03/13

117

ARB/03/14

Miminco LLC and others

Democratic
Republic of
the Congo

6/9/2003

11/19/2007

Ahmed Sadek ELKOSHERI
(Egyptian)

Marc LALONDE
(Canadian)

118

ARB/03/16

ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC
& ADMC Management Limited

Republic of
Hungary

7/17/2003

10/2/2006

Neil KAPLAN
(British)

Charles N.
BROWER (U.S.)

122

Peter TOMKA
(Slovak)
Héctor GROS
ESPIELL
(Uruguayan)

Catherine
KESSEDJIAN
(French)
Albert Jan VAN
DEN BERG
(Dutch)

No.

Case No.

Requesting Party

Respondent

Date of
Registration

Date of
outcome of
Proceeding

119

ARB/03/18

Aguas Cordobesas S.A., Suez,
and Sociedad General de Aguas
de Barcelona S.A.

Argentine
Republic

7/17/2003

120

ARB/03/20

Telefónica S.A

Argentine
Republic

121

ARB/03/24

Plama Consortium Limited

122

ARB/03/26

Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L.

123

ARB/03/29

Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret
Ve Sanayi A.S.

124

ARB(AF)/04/1

Corn Products International,
Inc.

125

ARB/04/2

Western NIS Enterprise Fund

126

ARB/04/3

127

Composition of Tribunal
President

Arbitrator I

Arbitrator II

1/24/2007

Jeswald W.
SALACUSE (U.S.)

Gabrielle
KAUFMANNKOHLER (Swiss)

Pedro NIKKEN
(Venezuelan)

7/21/2003

9/24/2009

Giorgio
SACERDOTI
(Italian)

Charles N.
BROWER (U.S.)

Eduardo T.
SIQUEIROS
(Mexican)

Republic of
Bulgaria

8/19/2003

8/27/2008

Carl F. SALANS
(U.S.)

Albert Jan VAN
DEN BERG
(Dutch)

V.V. VEEDER
(British)

Republic of El
Salvador

10/10/2003

11/16/2006

12/1/2003

8/27/2009

1/26/2004

3/23/2010

Ukraine

1/26/2004

6/1/2006

Cemex Asia Holdings Ltd

Republic of
Indonesia

1/27/2004

2/23/2007

ARB/04/5

Compagnie d'Exploitation du
Chemin de Fer Transgabonais

Gabonese
Republic

2/10/2004

5/11/2010

Franklin BERMAN
(British)

128

ARB/04/6

OKO Pankki Oyj and others

Republic of
Estonia

2/20/2004

11/19/2007

Otto L.O. de WITT
WIJNEN (Dutch)

Robert von
MEHREN (U.S.)
Ahmed Sadek ELKOSHERI
(Egyptian)
V.V. VEEDER
(British)

129

ARB/04/8

BP America Production
Company and others

Argentine
Republic

2/27/2004

8/20/2008

Lucius CAFLISCH
(Swiss)

Brigitte STERN
(French)

130

ARB/04/9

CIT Group Inc.

Argentine
Republic

2/27/2004

5/12/2009

Pierre-Marie
DUPUY (French)

Claus von
WOBESER
(Mexican)

Islamic
Republic of
Pakistan
United
Mexican
States

123

Rodrigo
OREAMUNO
(Costa Rican)
Gabrielle
KAUFMANNKOHLER (Swiss
Bernardo M.
CREMADES
(Spanish)
Rodrigo
OREAMUNO
(Costa Rican)
L. Yves FORTIER
(Canadian)

Burton LANDY
(U.S.)
Franklin BERMAN
(British)
Arthur W.
ROVINE (U.S.)
Jan PAULSSON
(French)

Claus von
WOBESER
(Mexican)
Karl-Heinz
BÖCKSTIEGEL
(German)
Eduardo T.
SIQUEIROS
(Mexican)
Michael C.
PRYLES
(Australian)
Brigitte STERN
(French)
Rolf KNIEPER
(German)
L. Yves FORTIER
(Canadian)
Albert Jan VAN
DEN BERG
(Dutch)
Christian
TOMUSCHAT
(German)

No.

Case No.

Requesting Party

Respondent

Date of
Registration

Date of
outcome of
Proceeding

131

ARB/04/10

Alstom Power Italia SpA and
Alstom SpA

Republic of
Mongolia

3/18/2004

3/13/2006

132

ARB/04/11

Russell Resources International
Limited and others

Democratic
Republic of
the Congo

4/6/2004

2/10/2009

133

ARB/04/13

Jan de Nul N.V. and Dredging
International N.V.

Arab Republic
of Egypt

5/27/2004

11/6/2008

134

ARB(AF)/04/2

Cargill, Incorporated

Republic of
Poland

7/7/2004

5/10/2005

135

ARB/04/14

Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft

Argentine
Republic

7/15/2004

12/8/2008

Fali S. NARIMAN
(Indian)

136

ARB/04/15

Telenor Mobile
Communications AS

Republic of
Hungary

8/2/2004

9/13/2006

Royston GOODE
(British)

Nicholas W.
ALLARD (U.S.)

137

ARB/04/17

Interbrew Central European
Holding B.V.

Republic of
Slovenia

8/25/2004

7/18/2005

Francisco ORREGO
VICUÑA (Chilean)

Charles N.
BROWER (U.S.)

138

ARB/04/18

France Telecom S.A.

Argentine
Republic

8/26/2004

3/30/2006

N/A

N/A

139

ARB(AF)/04/3

Gemplus, S.A., SLP, S.A. and
Gemplus Industrial, S.A. de C.V.

United
Mexican
States

9/29/2004

3/30/2006

V.V. VEEDER
(British)

L. Yves FORTIER
(Canadian)

140

ARB(AF)/04/4

Talsud, S.A.

United
Mexican
States

9/29/2004

6/18/2010

V.V. VEEDER
(British)

L. Yves FORTIER
(Canadian)

141

ARB(AF)/04/5

Archer Daniels Midland
Company and Tate & Lyle
Ingredients Americas, Inc.

United
Mexican
States

9/29/2004

7/10/2008

Bernardo M.
CREMADES
(Spanish)

Arthur W.
ROVINE (U.S.)

124

Composition of Tribunal
President

Arbitrator I

Marc LALONDE
(Canadian)

Jan PAULSSON
(French)

Horacio A.
GRIGERA NAÓN
(Argentine)
Gabrielle
KAUFMANNKOHLER (Swiss
Gabrielle
KAUFMANNKOHLER (Swiss

Franklin BERMAN
(British)

Arbitrator II
Anthony
MASON
(Australian)
Yawovi
AGBOYIBO
(Togolese)

Pierre MAYER
(French)

Brigitte STERN
(French)

Emmanuel
GAILLARD
(French)
Santiago TORRES
BERNÁRDEZ
(Spanish)

Bernard
HANOTIAU
(Belgian)
Piero
BERNARDINI
(Italian)
Arthur L.
MARRIOTT
(British)
Florentino P.
FELICIANO
(Philippine)
N/A
Eduardo
MAGALLÓN
GÓMEZ
(Mexican)
Eduardo
MAGALLÓN
GÓMEZ
(Mexican)
Eduardo T.
SIQUEIROS
(Mexican)

No.

Case No.

Requesting Party

Respondent

Date of
Registration

Date of
outcome of
Proceeding

142

ARB/04/19

Duke Energy Electroquil
Partners and Electroquil S.A.

Republic of
Ecuador

10/7/2004

143

ARB/04/20

RGA Reinsurance Company

Argentine
Republic

144

ARB/4/21

145

ARB/05/2

Motorola Credit Corporation,
Inc
Compañía General de
Electricidad S.A. and CGE
Argentina S.A.

Composition of Tribunal
President

Arbitrator I

Arbitrator II

8/18/2008

Gabrielle
KAUFMANNKOHLER (Swiss

Albert Jan VAN
DEN BERG
(Dutch)

11/11/2004

9/14/2006

Fali S. NARIMAN
(Indian)

Republic of
Turkey

12/28/2004

11/21/2005

Henri C. ÁLVAREZ
(Canadian)

Enrique GÓMEZPINZÓN
(Colombian)
Piero
BERNARDINI
(Italian)
Jan PAULSSON
(French)

Argentine
Republic

2/4/2005

7/28/2009

Pierre TERCIER
(Swiss)

Henri C. ÁLVAREZ
(Canadian)

Georges ABISAAB (Egyptian)

3/18/2005

11/12/2008

Pierre TERCIER
(Swiss)

Emmanuel
GAILLARD
(French)

Bernard
HANOTIAU
(Belgian)

4/6/2005

12/28/2007

Charles N.
BROWER (U.S.)

Pierre-Marie
DUPUY (French)

4/8/2005

12/19/2008

Georges ABISAAB (Egyptian)

4/15/2005

4/22/2009

Grant D.
ALDONAS (U.S.)
Mohammad
WASI ZAFAR
(Pakistani)

4/25/2005

6/30/2009

5/16/2005

9/11/2007

146

ARB/05/3

LESI, S.p.A. and Astaldi, S.p.A.

147

ARB/05/4

I&I Beheer B.V.

148

ARB/05/5

TSA Spectrum de Argentina,
S.A.

People's
Democratic
Republic of
Algeria
Bolivarian
Republic of
Venezuela
Argentine
Republic

149

ARB/05/6

Bernardus Henricus
Funnekotter and others

Republic of
Zimbabwe

150

ARB/05/7

Saipem S.p.A.

151

ARB/05/8

Parkerings-Compagniet AS

152

ARB/05/9

Empresa Eléctrica del Ecuador,
Inc. (EMELEC)

Republic of
Ecuador

5/26/2005

6/2/2009

153

ARB/05/10

Malaysian Historical Salvors,
SDN, BHD

Malaysia

6/14/2005

4/16/2009

People's
Republic of
Bangladesh
Republic of
Lithuania

125

Karl-Heinz
BÖCKSTIEGEL
(German)
Hans DANELIUS
(Swedish)
Gilbert
GUILLAUME
(French)
Gabrielle
KAUFMANNKOHLER (Swiss
Laurent LÉVY
(Brazilian/Swiss)
Bernardo
SEPÚLVEDA AMOR
(Mexican)
Stephen M.
SCHWEBEL (U.S.)

Ronald A. CASS
(U.S.)

Georges ABISAAB (Egyptian)
Pierre MAYER
(French)

Christoph H.
SCHREUER
(Austrian)
Marc LALONDE
(Canadian)

Julian D.M. LEW
(British)

John H. ROONEY
(U.S.)

W. Michael
REISMAN (U.S.)

Mohamed
SHAHABUDDEEN
(Guyanese)

Peter TOMKA
(Slovak)

Philip OTTON
(British)

No.

Case No.

Requesting Party

Respondent

Date of
Registration

Date of
outcome of
Proceeding

154

ARB(AF)/05/1

Bayview Irrigation District and
others

United
Mexican
States

7/1/2005

6/19/2007

155

ARB/05/12

Noble Energy Inc. and
MachalaPower Cía. Ltd.

Republic of
Ecuador

7/29/2005

5/20/2009

156

ARB/05/13

EDF (Services) Limited

Romania

7/29/2005

10/8/2009

157

ARB/05/15

Waguih Elie George Siag and
Clorinda Vecchi

Arab Republic
of Egypt

8/5/2005

6/21/2010

Stephen M.
SCHWEBEL (U.S.)

158

ARB(AF)/05/2

Cargill, Incorporated

United
Mexican
States

8/30/2005

9/18/2009

Michael C. PRYLES
(Australian)

David D. CARON
(U.S.)

Donald M.
McRAE
(Canadian)

159

ARB/05/16

Rumeli Telekom A.S. and
Telsim Mobil
Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri
A.S.

Republic of
Kazakhstan

8/30/2005

3/25/2010

Stephen M.
SCHWEBEL (U.S.)

Campbell
McLACHLAN
(New Zealand)

Eduardo SILVA
ROMERO
(Colombian)

160

ARB/05/17

Desert Line Projects LLC

Republic of
Yemen

9/30/2005

3/25/2010

Pierre TERCIER
(Swiss)

Ahmed Sadek ELKOSHERI
(Egyptian)

Jan PAULSSON
(French)

161

ARB/05/19

Helnan International Hotels
A/S

Arab Republic
of Egypt

10/5/2005

6/14/2010

Stephen M.
SCHWEBEL (U.S.)

Bola AJIBOLA
(Nigerian)

Campbell
McLACHLAN
(New Zealand)

162

ARB/05/21

African Holding Company of
America, Inc. and Société
Africaine de Construction au
Congo S.A.R.L.

Democratic
Republic of
the Congo

10/27/2005

7/29/2008

Francisco ORREGO
VICUÑA (Chilean)

Otto L.O. de WITT
WIJNEN (Dutch)

Dominique
GRISAY (Belgian)

163

ARB/05/22

Biwater Gauff (Tanzania)
Limited

United
Republic of
Tanzania

11/2/2005

7/24/2008

Gary B. BORN
(U.S.)

Toby LANDAU
(British)

164

ARB/05/23

Ares International S.r.l. and
MetalGeo S.r.l.

Georgia

11/9/2005

7/8/2008

Emmanuel
GAILLARD
(French)

John BEECHEY
(British)

126

Composition of Tribunal
President

Arbitrator I

Vaughan LOWE
(British)

Edwin MEESE III
(U.S.)

Gabrielle
KAUFMANNKOHLER (Swiss
Piero BERNARDINI
(Italian)

Bernard
HANOTIAU
(Belgian)
J. William
ROWLEY
(Canadian)

Henri C. ÁLVAREZ
(Canadian)
Arthur W.
ROVINE (U.S.)
Azzedine
KETTANI
(Moroccan)

Arbitrator II
Ignacio GÓMEZ
PALACIO
(Mexican)
Bernardo M.
CREMADES
(Spanish)
Yves DERAINS
(French)
Peter TOMKA
(Slovak)

No.

Case No.

Date of
Registration

Date of
outcome of
Proceeding

Requesting Party

Respondent

3/23/2006

4/15/2009

Composition of Tribunal
President

Arbitrator I

Brigitte STERN
(French)

Andreas BUCHER
(Swiss)

Gabrielle
KAUFMANNKOHLER (Swiss
Ahmed Sadek ELKOSHERI
(Egyptian)

Karl-Heinz
BÖCKSTIEGEL
(German)
Marc
GRÜNINGER
(Swiss)

Arbitrator II
Juan
FERNÁNDEZARMESTO
(Spanish)
Emmanuel
GAILLARD
(French)

165

ARB/06/5

Phoenix Action Ltd

Czech
Republic

166

ARB/06/6

Rail World LLC and others

Republic of
Estonia

4/5/2006

2/5/2007

167

ARB/06/7

Togo Electricité and GDF-Suez
Energie Services

Republic of
Togo

4/10/2006

8/10/2010

168

ARB(AF)/06/1

Sistem Muhendislik Insaat
Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S.

Kyrgyz
Republic

4/12/2006

9/9/2009

Vaughan LOWE
(British)

Nabil ELARABY
(Egyptian)

Paolo Michelle
PATOCCHI
(Swiss)

169

ARB/06/9

Branimir Mensik

Slovak
Republic

5/10/2006

12/9/2008

W. Michael
REISMAN (U.S.)

Karl-Heinz
BÖCKSTIEGEL
(German)

Bohuslav KLEIN
(Czech)

170

ARB/06/10

Chevron Bangladesh Block
Twelve, Ltd. and Chevron
Bangladesh Blocks Thirteen
and Fourteen, Ltd.

People's
Republic of
Bangladesh

6/30/2006

5/17/2010

Thomas
BUERGENTHAL
(U.S.)

John BEECHEY
(British)

Fali S. NARIMAN
(Indian)

171

ARB/06/12

Scancem International ANS

Republic of
Congo

7/17/2006

7/10/2008

N/A

N/A

N/A

172

ARB/06/13

Aguaytia Energy, LLC

Republic of
Peru

7/18/2006

12/11/2008

Robert BRINER
(Swiss)

J. William
ROWLEY
(Canadian)

Claus von
WOBESER
(Mexican)

173

ARB/06/14

Republic of
Nicaragua

8/11/2006

3/12/2007

N/A

N/A

N/A

174

ARB/06/15

Republic of
Azerbaijan

8/30/2006

9/8/2009

Florentino P.
FELICIANO
(Philippine)

Charles N.
BROWER (U.S.)

Christopher J.
GREENWOOD
(British)

175

ARB/06/16

Republic of
Azerbaijan

10/16/2006

9/28/2009

Vaughan LOWE
(British)

Peter W.
GALBRAITH (U.S.)

Brigitte STERN
(French)

Shell Brands International AG
and Shell Nicaragua S.A.
Azpetrol International Holdings
B.V., Azpetrol Group B.V. and
Azpetrol Oil Services Group
B.V.
Barmek Holding A.S.
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Marc LALONDE
(Canadian)

No.

Case No.

Requesting Party

Respondent

Date of
Registration

Date of
outcome of
Proceeding

President

Arbitrator I

Arbitrator II

176

ARB/06/17

Técnicas Reunidas, S.A. and
Eurocontrol, S.A.

Republic of
Ecuador

10/31/2006

5/13/2008

N/A

N/A

N/A

177

ARB(AF)/06/2

Cementownia "Nowa Huta"
S.A.

Republic of
Turkey

11/16/2006

9/17/2009

Pierre TERCIER
(Swiss)

Marc LALONDE
(Canadian)

J. Christopher
THOMAS
(Canadian)

178

ARB/06/20

Newmont USA Limited and
Newmont (Uzbekistan) Limited

Republic of
Uzbekistan

12/12/2006

7/25/2007

V.V. VEEDER
(British)

Christopher J.
GREENWOOD
(British)

VMarc LALONDE
(Canadian)

12/19/2006

9/12/2008

Juan FERNÁNDEZARMESTO
(Spanish)

J. Christopher
THOMAS
(Canadian)

Horacio A.
GRIGERA NAÓN
(Argentine)

Vaughan LOWE
(British)

Charles N.
BROWER (U.S.)

David A.R.
WILLIAMS (New
Zealand)
Gabrielle
KAUFMANNKOHLER (Swiss

J. William
ROWLEY
(Canadian)
Albert Jan VAN
DEN BERG
(Dutch)

Composition of Tribunal

179

ARB/06/21

City Oriente Limited

Republic of
Ecuador and
Empresa
Estatal
Petróleos del
Ecuador
(Petroecuado
r)

180

ARB(AF)/07/1

Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli
and others

Republic of
South Africa

1/8/2007

8/4/2010

181

ARB/07/1

Fondel Metal Participations
B.V.

Republic of
Azerbaijan

1/9/2007

1/23/2009

182

ARB/07/3

Government of the Province of
East Kalimantan

1/18/2007

12/28/2009

183

ARB/07/4

Eni Dación B.V.

2/6/2007

4/18/2008

N/A

N/A

N/A

184

ARB/07/7

Global Gold Mining LLC

2/20/2007

5/9/2008

N/A

N/A

N/A

185

ARB(AF)/07/2

Europe Cement Investment
and Trade S.A.

PT Kaltim
Prima Coal
and others
Bolivarian
Republic of
Venezuela
Republic of
Armenia
Republic of
Turkey

3/6/2007

8/13/2009

Donald M. McRAE
(Canadian)

Julian D.M. LEW
(British)

Laurent LÉVY
(Brazilian/Swiss)

186

ARB(AF)/07/3

Alasdair Ross Anderson and
others

Republic of
Costa Rica

3/27/2007

5/19/2010

Sandra MORELLI
RICO (Colombian)

Jeswald W.
SALACUSE (U.S.)

Raúl E. VINUESA
(Argentine)

128

Joseph M.
MATTHEWS
(U.S.)
Stephen M.
SCHWEBEL
(U.S.)
Michael HWANG
(Singaporean)

No.

Case No.

Requesting Party

Respondent

Date of
Registration

Date of
outcome of
Proceeding

187

ARB/07/11

ALAS International
Baustoffproduktions AG

Bosnia and
Herzegovina

5/9/2007

188

ARB/07/13

S&T Oil Equipment &
Machinery Ltd.

Romania

189

ARB/07/14

Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL
Dutch Investment BV

190

ARB/07/20

Saba Fakes

191

ARB/07/21

192

ARB/07/22

193

Composition of Tribunal
President

Arbitrator I

Arbitrator II

12/27/2007

Prosper WEIL
(French)

Stephen M.
SCHWEBEL (U.S.)

Mirko
VASILJEVIĆ
(Serbian)

7/16/2007

7/16/2010

Hans VAN HOUTTE
(Belgian)

Horacio A.
GRIGERA NAÓN
(Argentine)

Brigitte STERN
(French)

Republic of
Kazakhstan

7/16/2007

6/22/2010

Republic of
Turkey

8/13/2007

7/14/2010

Pantechniki S.A. Contractors &
Engineers
AES Summit Generation
Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü
Kft.

Republic of
Albania

8/13/2007

7/30/2009

N/A

Republic of
Hungary

8/13/2007

9/23/2010

Claus von
WOBESER
(Mexican)

ARB/07/24

Gustav F W Hamester GmbH &
Co KG

Republic of
Ghana

9/24/2007

6/18/2010

Brigitte STERN
(French)

194

ARB/07/25

Trans-Global Petroleum, Inc.

9/24/2007

4/8/2009

V.V. VEEDER
(British)

195

ARB/07/28

E.T.I. Euro Telecom
International N.V.

10/31/2007

10/21/2009

Bruno SIMMA
(German)

196

ARB/07/32

Astaldi S.p.A.

Republic of
Honduras

12/19/2007

9/17/2010

N/A

197

ARB/09/7

MTN (Dubai) Limited and
MTN Yemen for Mobile
Telephones

Republic of
Yemen

5/1/2009

6/25/2010

Marc LALONDE
(Canadian)

Hashemite
Kingdom of
Jordan
Plurinational
State of
Bolivia

Source: http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp

Karl-Heinz
BÖCKSTIEGEL
(German)
Emmanuel
GAILLARD (French)

Kaj HOBÉR
(Swedish)
Hans VAN
HOUTTE (Belgian)
Jan PAULSSON
(French)
J. William
ROWLEY
(Canadian)
Bernardo M.
CREMADES
(Spanish)
Donald M.
McRAE
(Canadian)
Francisco
ORREGO VICUÑA
(Chilean)
Eduardo SANCHO
GONZÁLEZ (Costa
Rican)
Barton LEGUM
(U.S.)

James R.
CRAWFORD
(Australian)
Laurent LÉVY
(Brazilian/Swiss)
N/A
Brigitte STERN
(French)
Toby LANDAU
(British)
James R.
CRAWFORD
(Australian)
Philippe SANDS
(British/French)
N/A
Daniel M. PRICE
(U.S.)

As of Sep. 2, 2010
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Vita
Injae Park was born on July 19, 1978, in Kyungbuk, S. Korea. He graduated from
Dalsung High School and started at Andong National University in 1997. He graduated
from the University in 2005. After the graduation, he would teach English and travel to
the Philippines. And he started graduate school at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville
in 2007. The degree of Master of Arts in Political Science will be awarded in May 2011.
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